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The Federal Arbitration Act and
the Power of Congress over
State Courts
When pre-emption of state law is at issue, we must respect the
principles [that] are fundamental to a system of federalism in
which the state courts share responsibility for the application
and enforcement of federal law.  This respect is at its apex
when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to
undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the op-
eration of its courts.1
[Federal Arbitration Act preemption] entails a permanent, un-
authorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a poten-
tially large class of disputes.2
The Federal Arbitration Act is unconstitutional as applied tothe states—and no one has noticed.  In its 1984 decision
Southland Corp. v. Keating ,3 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)4 is substantive
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UCLA School of Law for providing me with logistical support while I was on re-
search leave writing this article.  Finally, for the research leave itself, I am indebted
to University of Wisconsin Law School and the Anton Smongeski Fund for Faculty
Research.
1 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 (1997) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
2 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
3 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
4 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).  Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transac-
tion, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
[541]
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law that binds state courts under the Supremacy Clause and
preempts contrary state law.5  “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims  which the contracting parties agreed to re-
solve by arbitration.”6  Dissenting justices and academic critics
have focused on the statutory interpretation question, arguing
(correctly) that Congress intended nothing of the sort.7  But even
critics of FAA preemption have failed to raise the underlying
constitutional question.  Assuming Congress had intended the
FAA to preempt state law, where did Congress get this power to
bar the states from requiring a judicial forum for cases properly
filed in state court?  This article argues that FAA preemption is
nothing more or less than procedural regulation of state courts,
and that Congress lacks the power to regulate procedures in state
courts.  In short, FAA preemption is unconstitutional.8
5 465 U.S. at 16 (explaining that FAA section 2 “creat[es] a substantive rule appli-
cable in state as well as federal courts”).
6 Id . at 10 (emphasis added).
7 Justice Scalia, for instance, in the statement quoted as an epigraph to this article,
meant that the eviction of state court procedural power was unauthorized by Con-
gress .  He did not consider whether it was authorized by the constitution . Accord
Southland , 465 U.S. at 22-31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce , 513 U.S. at
285-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—INTERNATIONALIZATION 92-121 (1992);
David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:  The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act , 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes]; Stephen L. Hayford
& Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration ,
54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 183 (2002); Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Secur-
ities Arbitration,  62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1469 n.33 (1996); Paul D. Carrington &
Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction , 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 380 (1996).  For
a thought-provoking argument concluding that the Southland  Court reached a cor-
rect conclusion about the FAA’s legislative history, see Christopher R. Drahozal, In
Defense of Southland:  Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act , 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002) [hereinafter Drahozal, In Defense of
Southland].  I believe Professor Drahozal is incorrect in this, for reasons I have ex-
plained elsewhere. See  Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra , at 18 n.89.
Professor Drahozal and I debate the issue in greater detail in David S. Schwartz,
FAA Preemption:  Does it Wipe Out State Contract Law?  10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 23
(Spring 2004) and Christopher R. Drahozal, Revisiting Southland , 10 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 23 (Spring 2004).
8 No academic commentator so far as I know has argued that FAA preemption is
unconstitutional.  I have argued elsewhere that FAA preemption raises sufficient
constitutional doubts to trigger the twin statutory interpretation policies of constitu-
tional avoidance and presumption against preemption.  Schwartz, Correcting Feder-
alism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 48-50 & n.246.  In a different context, and on
entirely different grounds, Jean Sternlight has questioned the constitutionality of the
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the states’ sover-
eignty over the procedures of their own courts is a foundational
principle of federalism.9  Procedure in this sense includes not
only rules of practice, but also questions of court structure (such
as whether there will be an intermediate appellate court and how
many judges will sit on it) and questions of jurisdiction.  The
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply federal substan-
tive law, but subject to a few narrow and very limited exceptions,
state courts have the power to apply neutral state rules of proce-
dure and jurisdiction to unremoved federal claims.  The Constitu-
tion also authorizes Congress, acting within its enumerated
powers, to federalize an area of substantive law and make federal
court jurisdiction exclusive, thereby displacing state courts from
hearing that set of claims.10  But the FAA is not such a statute.
The FAA does not create federal question jurisdiction, let alone
exclusive jurisdiction in federal court.11  On its face, the FAA is a
statute enforcing arbitration agreements, which in turn deter-
mine the allocation of decision-making authority between a court
and arbitrator, and set up the rules governing the dispute resolu-
tion process.  Such questions of structure and practice are funda-
mentally procedural, and in every context other than
preemption, the Supreme Court has determined that the law of
FAA insofar as enforcement of arbitration agreements imposes an impermissible
waiver of due process and the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. See  Jean R.
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and
Due Process Concerns , 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); see also  Richard C. Reuben, Con-
stitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public
Civil Justice , 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 989 (2000) (arguing that statutorily-enforced
arbitration agreements raise constitutional state action issues).
Nor to my knowledge have any litigants squarely raised the issue.  An amicus
curiae brief in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle , 539 U.S. 444 (2003), argued
that the FAA’s restructuring of state dispute resolution procedures without a sub-
stantive federal interest at stake raised constitutional doubts.  Brief of Law Profes-
sors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22-25.  (This author was lead
counsel and co-author of the brief. Id .)  None of the opinions in Bazzle  addressed
the argument. See  539 U.S. 444.
9 “The States thus have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of
their own courts.”  Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997).  One would expect
this principle to have particular force now, when a majority of the Court is thought
to be leading a federalism revival—even a federalism “revolution.” See , e.g. , Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism De-
cisions , 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002); see also  Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Federalism Revolution , 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001).
10 See infra  Part III.C.
11 See infra  text accompanying notes 57-58, 261-62.
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arbitration agreements is procedural and not substantive.12  The
constitutional problem of applying the FAA to the states has
been avoided or overlooked, simply by taking at face value the
Southland  Court’s assertion that the FAA is “substantive” law.
But what if it is not?
If the FAA is really procedural, then its constitutionality as ap-
plied to the states depends on the existence of a power of Con-
gress over state courts.  This larger constitutional question, too,
has received comparatively scant analysis from courts and com-
mentators.13  Yet its importance is emerging, as Congress seems
increasingly to put forward legislative proposals regulating state
court procedures as an indirect way of achieving “tort reform.”14
The FAA itself is an example of this: it is now on the edge of
being reshaped as a federal tort reform statute, allowing corpo-
rate defendants who draft adhesive arbitration agreements to ex-
empt themselves from significant aspects of state contract
regulation, particularly in the consumer and employment con-
texts.  But the FAA is unique in an important sense: whereas
most other tort reform proposals mingle procedural controls with
substantive liability rules, the FAA is pure procedural regulation.
Although the Supreme Court has just recently noted that it has
never decided the question of the power of Congress to “pre-
scribe procedural rules for state courts’ adjudication of purely
state-law claims,”15 that issue will become increasingly difficult to
avoid.
Part I of this Article examines the practical impact of South-
land ’s doctrine of FAA preemption on states’ authority to regu-
late their own judicial processes.  Not only does the enforcement
of arbitration agreements impose a particular procedural regime
12 See infra  Part IV.A.
13 The relevant case law is discussed infra  Parts II, III.  Among a small handful of
scholarly commentary on this question, the leading articles are Anthony J. Bellia,
Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures , 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001); Wendy
E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption:  the Proposed Federalization  of State Court Proce-
dures , 44 VILL. L. REV. 1, 42-52 (1999).  While both Professors Bellia and Parmet
conclude, as I do, that Congress lacks the authority to regulate state court procedure
for state law claims, I believe the power of Congress to do so where federal claims
are present is even less than Bellia and Parmet suggest. See infra  Part II.B.3.  Fur-
ther thoughtful commentary on the subject is found in Louise Weinberg, The Power
of Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases , 1995 BYU L. REV. 731 (1995); Mar-
garet G. Stewart, Federalism and Supremacy:  Control of State Judicial Decision-
Making , 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431 (1992).
14 See infra  Part I.C.
15 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 464-65 (2003).
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on state court litigants, but it also represents the allocation of
power between alternative forums in the state’s dispute resolu-
tion machinery.  The resulting doctrine of FAA preemption has
nullified dozens of state contract laws, sown confusion in the
courts, and set the FAA to become a significant “tort reform”
statute.
Part II analyzes the extent, and limits, of federal power over
the structure, jurisdiction, and procedure of state courts for unre-
moved cases.  By “unremoved cases,” I mean those for which
federal diversity or “arising under” jurisdiction is available, but
which stay in state court because the plaintiff chose to file there
and the defendant declined to remove the action to federal
court.16  I argue that the constitutional text fails to create any
congressional power over state court systems beyond the require-
ment that state courts entertain federal claims, and that there is
no basis to infer that Congress has a power in any other respect
to treat state courts as federal courts for cases falling within the
federal judicial power.  Rather, in limited and exceptional cir-
cumstances, federal substantive law may at most require adjust-
ments in state procedures to ensure that states apply federal
substantive law in a non-discriminatory manner.  But Congress
cannot require state courts to change their structure or jurisdic-
tion, or to adopt alien procedures, even where the state courts
are hearing cases under federal substantive law.  The constitu-
tional principle that federal law “treats state courts as it finds
them” is consistent with both longstanding Supreme Court prece-
dent known as the “reverse-Erie” doctrine, as well as the more
recent “anti-commandeering” doctrine.
Part III looks at possible congressional power over state proce-
dure in the absence of federal jurisdiction.  I argue that the ab-
sence of any federal substantive interest makes the claim to
control state procedure even weaker.  The only constitutional ba-
sis for such a power would be either the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  But an arguable
power to regulate state court procedures as commerce does not
overcome the state sovereignty interests reflected in the anti-
commandeering doctrine and elsewhere.  Nor does the power to
regulate a field substantively and to displace state courts through
exclusive federal jurisdiction imply a “lesser included” power to
regulate state courts where Congress has not federalized the rele-
16 See infra  Part III.A.
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vant substantive law.  Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment autho-
rizes Congress to regulate procedure only in limited
circumstances where existing state procedures fail to meet mini-
mal due process guarantees, and creates no general congressional
power over state court procedure.
In Part IV, I apply these principles to the FAA.  Given the
fundamental principle that Congress has the power to impose
substantive, but not procedural, law on the states, it becomes
necessary to determine whether the FAA is substantive or proce-
dural for purposes of the Supremacy Clause and preemption.
Southland , of course, says the FAA is substantive; but that deter-
mination, which has never rested on anything more than the
Court’s own say-so, does not withstand scrutiny.  I examine the
substance-procedure distinction in six arguably relevant contexts
and show that the FAA is properly seen as procedural when
viewed from any angle.
I
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT’S PREEMPTION OF
STATE LAW
FAA preemption means the displacement of state law on the
grounds that it conflicts with the FAA, or creates an obstacle to
the statute’s purported “proarbitration policy.”17  FAA preemp-
17 See, e.g. , Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57
(1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption , 79
IND. L.J. 393, 394-95 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FAA Preemption].  The general
law of preemption can be briefly summarized as follows:  “[U]nder the Supremacy
Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however
clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to
federal law, must yield.’”  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n., 505 U.S. 88, 108
(1992).  Assuming that legislation is within Congress’ enumerated powers, its power
to displace state law as part of that legislation is “plenary.” See, e.g. , United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 609 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
The black-letter preemption doctrine tells us that preemption, while constitution-
ally based in the Supremacy Clause, is an issue of congressional intent.  With con-
gressional intent as the central issue, the courts have organized doctrine into
questions of “express” and “implied” preemption.  Express preemption cases in-
volve the interpretation of federal statutes with an express provision dealing with
preemption. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (2000) (providing that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”).  Implied
preemption cases involve statutes with no such preemptive language, and try to de-
termine the preemptive intent of Congress in other provisions of the statute or its
legislative history.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 7 18-FEB-05 9:29
The Federal Arbitration Act 547
tion began with the Southland  decision in 1984.  For a decade
and a half, Southland  was understood as construing the FAA to
bind state courts and preempt state laws that target arbitration
agreements for special barriers to enforcement.  In effect, this
turned the FAA into an attack on the autonomy of state proce-
dural systems, as well as on the states’ related policy choices to
preserve the right to go to court for certain types of substantive
claims.  However, Southland ’s incoherent and internally contra-
dictory character has made it difficult to confine its preemptive
sweep to the “mere” undermining of state autonomy over the
procedural and jurisdictional question of whether a dispute will
be litigated or arbitrated.  More recent preemption litigation has
raised the question of whether an arbitration agreement can be
used by drafting parties to obtain significant procedural, reme-
dial, and even substantive advantages or to immunize themselves
from certain forms of contract regulation entirely.
A. FAA Preemption as a Restructuring of State Court Systems
The division of authority between courts and arbitrators is a
question of procedure, court structure and jurisdiction—“the
State’s allocation of power between alternative tribunals.”18
State law rights of action, whether “public law” or “private law,”
provide for the invocation of the state’s dispute resolution ma-
chinery.19  Provisions for arbitration of cases that would other-
wise be heard in state court are plainly part of the state’s dispute
resolution system.  Arbitration systems, and the statutes that give
them the sanction of law, therefore form part of the structure and
Implied preemption is divided, by the doctrine, into further subcategories.
“Field” preemption is a finding by the Court that Congress intended to occupy a
particular field of legislation to the exclusion of the states; any state law in the field
will be preempted irrespective of whether the law is consistent with federal law. See,
e.g ., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).  Under “conflict” preemption,
in contrast, a state law is void only if it conflicts with federal law.  Caleb Nelson,
Preemption , 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227-28 (2000).  The notion of a conflict has been
defined by two further categories.  If the commands of federal and state law are so in
conflict that it is impossible to comply with both, then the state law is void. See, e.g .,
Fla. Lime & Avocado, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).  Finally, a conflict
will also be found if the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  FAA preemption is deemed to be located in this last cate-
gory. See, e.g. , Volt Info Scis., Inc. , 489 U.S. at 477; Drahozal, FAA Preemption ,
supra , at 396-98.
18 Mastrobuono , 514 U.S. at 60.
19 See  Reuben, supra  note 8, at 957-58.
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jurisdiction of state courts.  Particularly in the current era when
most civil suits are potentially arbitrable under both state statutes
and the FAA,20  arbitration has taken on the role of “a civil court
of general jurisdiction.”21
The FAA restructures state courts by determining most of
these judicial-power-allocation questions under federal law.  The
FAA does not explicitly make its provision applicable to the
states.  But since its 1984 decision in Southland , the Supreme
Court has construed the FAA as creating a rule that state laws,
whether legislative or judicial, that target arbitration agreements
for special barriers to enforcement are preempted, whereas “gen-
erally applicable contract defenses” and rules that “arose to gov-
ern . . . contracts generally” may be applied to arbitration
agreements “without contravening [FAA] § 2.”22  These latter
exceptions to FAA preemption will be discussed in the following
sections.
The FAA’s restructuring of state judicial processes takes at
least two forms.  First, when a state court enforces an arbitration
agreement under the FAA, it imposes arbitration in place of its
own judicial procedures for resolution of the merits of the case.23
Second, the decision to enforce arbitration rather than allow a
case to be litigated in state court directly implicates the state’s
“allocation of power between alternative tribunals.”24  The FAA
shifts authority over this allocation of power from states to con-
tract-making individuals.25  While every state has enacted an ar-
bitration statute providing for specific enforcement of arbitration
20 See, e.g. , David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Em-
ployee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration , 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 33, 95-104 [hereinafter Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print].
21 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitra-
tion , 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997).
22 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
23 What procedures the state court must use to enforce the arbitration agreement
remains unclear.  Most states have their own procedures for staying litigation and
compelling arbitration.  In federal court, such procedures are specified by sections 3
and 4 of the FAA.  But the Supreme Court has “never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by
their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court, are nonetheless
applicable in state court,” and has expressed doubt about applying them to state
courts. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. , 489 U.S. at 477 n.6; see infra  text accompanying notes
91-96.
24 Mastrobuono , 514 U.S. at 60.
25 Under the FAA, “parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agree-
ments as they see fit.  Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will
arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration
will be conducted.” Volt Info Scis., Inc. , 489 U.S. at 479 (internal citations omitted).
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agreements, adopting language similar to the FAA,26 several of
these state arbitration statutes limit the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, typically by carving out an exception to the gen-
eral rule of enforcement.27  The Supreme Court has held that
Congress may exempt a certain kind of claim from arbitration by
an express provision or by implication showing such an intent,
but under Southland , states are denied that authority.28  Dozens,
and probably hundreds, of state laws declining to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements for various consumer or employment contracts
have been held to be, or presumably are, preempted by South-
land .29  Each of these exceptions to enforcement of arbitration
agreements represents a state effort to allocate dispute resolution
power to courts for specific substantive claims.
State courts make important policy determinations regarding
the structure of their dispute resolution systems in determining
whether specific remedies—as opposed to causes of action—can
be issued by arbitrators.30  But the Supreme Court has suggested
26 Reuben, supra  note 8, at 976.
27 See  Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 13-14 (citing
state statutes).  The FAA itself exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce.”  FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  This exemption from FAA coverage has been
construed improbably narrowly to mean “transportation workers.” See  Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
28 Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).  Thus, a statute
in California’s Labor Code preserving the administrative and judicial forum, and
barring enforcement of arbitration agreements, for claims for unpaid wages was held
preempted by the Court in Perry v. Thomas , 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (preempting
CAL. LABOR CODE § 229 (West 2003)).
29 Between January 2002 and April 2004, almost fifty state laws were held pre-
empted.  David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism:  Resisting the
Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law , 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
129, 154-59, app. A (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, State Judges]; see also  Schwartz,
Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 13-14.  Moreover, individual pre-
emption rulings are just the tip of the iceberg because the preemption of one state
law by a binding precedent will effectively preempt similar laws.  The generic an-
tiwaiver language held preempted in Southland appears in at least thirty state laws
other than the one before the Court. See  Schwartz, State Judges , supra , at 160-61
app. B.  This suggests that hundreds of state laws are held preempted each year.
30 In Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. , 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976), for example, the
New York Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator cannot award punitive damages,
even if agreed to by the parties.  Punitive damages, the court reasoned, are “a social
exemplary ‘remedy,’ not a private compensatory remedy,” and are therefore “re-
served to the State” as a “public policy of such magnitude as to call for judicial
intrusion.” Id . at 795, 796 (internal quotations omitted).  More recently, two deci-
sions from the California Supreme Court have held that statutory “public policy”
claims could not be compelled into arbitration, because the arbitrator could not is-
sue broad injunctive relief for the benefit of the general public.  In Broughton v.
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that the FAA casts serious doubt on states’ authority to restrict
the remedial powers of arbitrators.  In Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc. , the defendant Shearson had added to its
adhesive arbitration clause a choice of law clause that incorpo-
rated New York law.31  Shearson argued that the choice of New
York law incorporated a New York decisional rule, known as the
Garrity  rule, barring arbitrators from awarding punitive dam-
ages.32  Although limiting issues to be submitted to an arbitrator
and waiving substantive rights may be two different matters en-
tirely, Shearson intended to weld the two together, arguing to the
Court that “the parties to a contract may lawfully agree to limit
the issues to be arbitrated by waiving any claim  for punitive dam-
ages.” 33  The arbitrator did award punitive damages to the Mas-
trobuonos—$400,000—and Shearson went to court to vacate that
part of the award.  The Supreme Court affirmed the punitive
damage award.  Although noting that punitive damages are “an
important substantive right,” the Court did not decide whether a
Cigna Healthplans of Cal. , 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999), the court held that claims for
injunctive relief under the state Consumer Legal Remedies Act designed to protect
the public from deceptive business practices were not subject to arbitration. Id . at
79; accord  Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1165 (Cal. 2003)
(extending Broughton  to preserve claims to enjoin unfair competition and mislead-
ing advertising under the state Business and Professions Code).  According to the
Broughton  and Cruz  courts, such claims were unsuitable for arbitration because (1)
these statutory injunction claims were “for the benefit of the general public rather
than the party bringing the action,” and (2) courts have “significant institutional
advantages over arbitration in administering a public injunctive remedy, which as a
consequence will likely lead to the diminution or frustration of the public benefit if
the remedy is entrusted to arbitrators.” Id.  at 1162 (quoting Broughton , 988 P.2d at
67).  For these reasons, the court concluded there was an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the statutory remedies, which gave rise to the inference that the state
legislature intended to withhold the substantive claims from arbitration.
It stands to reason that a substantive claim should be withheld from arbitration if
the arbitrator is not authorized to issue a remedy crucial to the claim.  This principle
follows logically from the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition that “[b]y agreeing
to arbitrate . . . a party does not forego . . . substantive rights . . . .” See  Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  Thus, courts have denied arbitration where the con-
tract deprives the arbitrator of remedial authority sufficient to redress the substan-
tive claim. See, e.g. , Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,
674 (Cal. 2000). See generally  David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping
Arbitration Clauses:  Validity, Arbitrability and Preclusion Principles , 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 49, 66-74 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping Clauses].
31 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995).
32 See Garrity , 353 N.E.2D 793, 794, discussed supra  note 30.
33 514 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
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prospective waiver of that right in an arbitration clause would be
enforceable, instead relying on a contractual ambiguity to con-
strue the agreement to permit the arbitrator to award punitive
damages.34  In passing, the Court indicated that its prior FAA
preemption decisions make clear that
[I]f contracting parties agree to include  claims for punitive
damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures
that their agreement will be enforced according to its terms
even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims
from arbitration . . . .  [I]n the absence of contractual intent to
the contrary, the FAA would pre-empt the Garrity  rule.35
This statement, although dictum, presages a future preemption
decision that would intrude on this state allocation of remedial
power.36
An important, recurring question in the law of arbitration is
34 In language of great significance for the constitutional argument discussed be-
low, the Court reasoned that the choice-of-law clause could reasonably have been
read to incorporate New York substantive law, but not its arbitration law—the latter
being part of the state’s “allocation of power between alternative tribunals.”  514
U.S. at 59-60.
35 Id.  at 52, 59.
36 Because the arbitration occurred in Illinois and the arbitration enforcement
procedures were heard in federal court, the case did not squarely raise the question
of New York’s power to allocate decision-making authority between its own courts
and an arbitrator.  Since the Mastrobuono  court essentially defined the Garrity  rule
as procedural law, it therefore arguably has no application to an Illinois proceeding
under standard conflict-of-laws principles wholly irrespective of FAA preemption.
See infra  notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
Mastrobuono  naturally gives rise to the argument that Broughton  and Cruz  were
wrongly decided.  It is worth noting, however, that Broughton  and Cruz  are distin-
guishable from Garrity , and arguably fall outside the dictum from Mastrobuono .
Garrity , like Mastrobuono  and all of the FAA preemption cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court to date, involved private damages claims, not public injunctions, so
the Court has never had occasion to determine whether broad injunctive relief af-
fecting third parties or the public can be issued by arbitrators. See Cruz , 66 P.3d at
1163 (quoting Broughton , 988 P.2d at 78–79).  What the Court has said, however, is
that compelled arbitration of statutory claims is appropriate insofar as the claimant
“does not forgo . . . substantive rights[.]” E.g.,  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  Arbitrators’ authority arises from private
contracts, and it is hard to imagine how two private parties can empower an arbitra-
tor to make decisions binding on third parties and the public at large, while main-
taining any semblance of a private, contractual form of dispute resolution.  Thus,
even zealous arbitration advocates would hesitate to assert that arbitrators can issue
and administer public injunctions; absent an express assertion to that effect by the
Supreme Court, it is reasonable for a state court to conclude that arbitrators cannot
do so.  This the California courts have done.  In such a case, compelling public in-
junction claims into arbitration would indeed “forgo substantive rights.”
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“arbitrability”—whether a court or an arbitrator will decide the
merits of the case.37  An arbitrability decision is, in effect, a de-
termination of the jurisdictional boundary between the arbitrator
and the court.38  Since arbitration is a creation of contract, and
the power of an arbitrator flows from the parties’ agreement,
arbitrability is a question of contract interpretation.39  Arbi-
trability thus presents a question of presumptive state law twice
over: the interpretation of a contract—a matter of state law that
federal courts should be “reluctant to federalize”40—that will de-
termine a question of state judicial jurisdiction.  Nevertheless,
under FAA section 2, a state court deciding arbitrability—decid-
ing, therefore, its own power to decide a merits issue in a case
before it—must apply federal law, which tilts in favor of arbitra-
tion and against state judicial power.41  In this way, too, the FAA
37 See, e.g. , Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 82-83 (2002);
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).  Although there is
some confusion surrounding the term, it is best defined as either of the following two
questions:  (1) whether the arbitration agreement covers the parties, or (2) whether
the arbitration agreement extends to the substantive issues raised.  Schwartz, Rem-
edy-Stripping Clauses , supra  note 30, at 75-76.
38 Arbitrability cases have included decisions about whether a court or arbitrator
decides such issues as:  whether the contract containing the arbitration clause was
procured by fraud, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
396-97 (1967); whether a statute of limitations bars the arbitration from proceeding
on the merits, Howsam , 537 U.S. at 82; or whether an arbitration provision barring
the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages prevents an award of statutory treble
damages, PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 431, 432 (2003).  Federal
common law has awarded each of these decisions to the arbitrator.  The question of
who decides arbitrability—literally, “who decides who decides”—is normally for the
courts, though an arbitration agreement can give that decision to an arbitrator as
well. See First Options , 514 U.S. at 942-43.
39 “Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties . . .
may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate . . . .” Volt Info Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. , 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989); accord United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)
(“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”).  The FAA provides
for a reviewing court to set aside an arbitration award that exceeds the arbitrator’s
authority or reaches matters not submitted to the arbitrator.  FAA §§ 10(a), 11(b).
See also  Schwartz, Remedy Stripping Clauses , supra  note 30, at 80 (“[A]rbitrators
‘exist’ as dispute-resolving entities only if there is a valid contract so empowering
them.”).
40 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 183 (1989) (quoting  Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)).
41 FAA section 2 “create[s] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, ap-
plicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act,” and further
provides that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitra-
ble issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 24-25 (1983).  The Court has backtracked—
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restructures state dispute resolution processes.
A plain, recent example of the FAA’s restructuring of state
court systems is the decision last term in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle .42  In Bazzle,  defendant Green Tree successfully
moved to compel arbitration of two separate consumer class ac-
tions filed in South Carolina courts.  The arbitrator ultimately
found for the claimants in both class actions, and awarded a total
of approximately $27 million in damages and attorneys’ fees
against Green Tree.  The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected
Green Tree’s challenge to the classwide arbitration procedure, on
the ground that class arbitration was permissible as a matter of
state procedural law.  Green Tree argued to the U.S. Supreme
Court that an arbitration agreement that does not expressly au-
thorize class arbitrations must be construed, as a matter of fed-
eral law, to bar class claims entirely; and, so construed, the
contract must be enforced under the FAA, notwithstanding the
state’s procedural law allowing classwide arbitration.
Although the opinions in Bazzle  resolved very little other than
the case at hand,43 the implications for the state’s sovereignty
over their own courts are striking.  A four-justice plurality opin-
ion by Justice Breyer reasoned that the issue of “whether the [ar-
bitration] agreement forbids class arbitration” was a contract-
interpretation question for the arbitrator.44  The plurality (joined
in the judgment by Justice Stevens) vacated the judgment of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, and remanded the case to allow
the arbitrator to make this highly significant determination, one
which could make or break a case.45  State procedural law might
apply, but the decision to invoke it is removed by the FAA from
state courts and reallocated to an arbitrator.  Meanwhile, three
dissenting justices argued that the contract “simply” precluded
class arbitrations and that the application of a state law rule to
though only slightly—from the notion that the law of arbitrability is entirely federal,
stating that “in applying general state-law  principles of contract interpretation to the
interpretation of an arbitration agreement . . . due regard must be given to the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration
clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Volt Info Scis., Inc. , 489 U.S. at 475-76
(emphasis added).
42 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
43 Bazzle  implies that class arbitrations are permissible; but the two opinions
forming the judgment do not indicate whether an unambiguous class action ban
would be enforceable.
44 539 U.S. at 451 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion).
45 See infra  note 96 and accompanying text.
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vary those written terms should have been preempted by the
FAA.46  Thus, seven justices seem to have taken for granted—
without any constitutional analysis—that these significant mat-
ters of state court procedure and jurisdiction are to be decided as
a matter of federal law under the FAA.
B. The Fundamental Incoherence of Southland and
its Progeny
Southland ’s determination that the FAA is substantive, pre-
emptive federal law is based on reasoning that is at odds with
both the FAA and subsequent FAA preemption decisions.  The
result of these inconsistencies is some incoherence in the judicial
efforts to sort out what aspects of state law are saved from pre-
emption by the terms of the statute.
1. The Southland Decision
In Southland Corp. v. Keating , several California franchisees of
7-Eleven convenience stores sued the corporate owner-
franchisor of the 7-Eleven chain in state court under various state
law theories, one of which was based on a state franchise law
designed to protect franchisees against overreaching by
franchisors.47  Southland sought to compel arbitration of all
claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the form franchise
agreement.  But the California Supreme Court denied arbitration
on the basis of a generic antiwaiver provision in the Franchise
Investment Law, which stated that “[a]ny condition, stipulation
or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any
franchise to waive compliance with any provision  of this law or
any rule or order hereunder is void.”48  The California court rea-
soned that the arbitration agreement operated as a waiver of the
statutory right to a jury trial, and was therefore void under the
46 Bazzle , 539 U.S. 444, 458-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47 465 U.S. 1, 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing California Franchise Invest-
ment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977)).
48 CAL. CORP. CODE. § 31512 (West 1977) (emphasis added).  This antiwaiver pro-
vision is modeled after an antiwaiver provision in section 14 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n, which has long served as a model for the drafting of con-
sumer-protection statutes of all kinds through the country. See  Drahozal, FAA Pre-
emption , supra  note 17, at 409 n.127 (listing state antiwaiver provisions); Edward J.
Heiser, Jr., The Wisconsin Consumer Act—A Critical Analysis , 57 MARQ. L. REV.
389, 480-82 (1974) (discussing antiwaiver provision in 1974 state consumer protec-
tion statute based on 1933 Securities Act); Schwartz, State Judges , supra  note 29, at
app. B (2004) (listing state antiwaiver provisions).
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antiwaiver provision.49  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the state rule against arbitrating statutory franchise dis-
putes was preempted by section 2 of the FAA.  Section 2 created
a substantive “national policy favoring arbitration” that con-
flicted with a state rule that would prevent a category of claims
from being arbitrated.50
The Southland  decision was correct on one key point: in order
to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, Congress
must enact substantive law. Southland  seems implicitly to have
recognized the constitutional principle, argued in detail below,
that Congress lacks power to make purely procedural regulations
binding on state courts.
But Southland  is otherwise a poorly-reasoned decision.  I have
argued elsewhere that the Court should not have attributed to
Congress an intention to make the FAA preemptive substantive
law.  Given the FAA’s silence on the question of the statute’s
applicability in state court, and legislative history pointing
strongly against  a construction that the FAA preempts state law,
the preemption holding was a stretch and becomes increasingly
difficult to justify in the Court’s recent federalism revival.51  Irre-
spective of what Congress may have intended, Southland ’s criti-
cal argument, defining the FAA as substantive rather than
procedural law for preemption purposes, is extremely thin.  On
its face, the question of the allocation of a state’s power between
alternative dispute resolution processes seems quintessentially
like the sort of procedural or jurisdictional question committed
to a state’s sovereignty and not to Congress.52  The Southland
majority, disregarding this, decided that the FAA was “substan-
tive” law because it reasoned that Congress, by basing the FAA
on its power “to enact substantive rules under the Commerce
Clause,” necessarily makes “substantive” law binding on state as
well as federal courts.53 Southland ’s preemption ruling also cre-
ated a conundrum: interpreting the FAA as preempting state law
49 See Southland , 465 U.S. at 10 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512).
50 465 U.S. at 10.  The relevant language is quoted supra  text accompanying note
6.
51 Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 18-27, 44-50. But
see  Drahozal, Revisiting Southland , supra  note 7.
52 See infra  Part II.
53 465 U.S. at 11-12.  In fact, the Court has elsewhere recognized that Congress
may indeed enact procedural or “housekeeping” rules for federal courts under any
applicable enumerated power, including the Commerce Clause. See  Stewart Org. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 & n.11 (1988); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
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necessarily meant deciding that the FAA is “substantive” law, yet
the statute makes clear that it creates no federal question.54  The
FAA provides for enforcement of section 2 only in federal courts,
either where a suit is already pending (section 3), or by petition
to a federal district court “which, save for such agreement, would
have jurisdiction” (section 4).55  These provisions have always
been understood as conferring no independent federal question
jurisdiction.56  When it suggested for the first time the year
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Schwartz,
Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 34-38.
The Court may have felt no need to justify its conclusion that the FAA is substan-
tive law, given its decision the preceding year in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  There, the Court had stated that
Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural policies to the contrary.  The effect of the section is to
create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.
Id . at 24.  However, this statement in Moses H. Cone  was itself devoid of justifica-
tion, and it is probably dicta as well, see Southland , 465 U.S. at 24 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting), because the questions of the FAA’s preemptive effect or its applicability
in state court were not raised.
The Southland  Court may also have mistaken the Court’s earlier decision in
Prima Paint Corp. , 388 U.S. at 395, for a declaration that the FAA is substantive
law.  But Prima Paint  did not say that, holding only that “[f]ederal courts are bound
to apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters—here, a contract involv-
ing commerce—over which it has legislative power.” Id . at 406.  Indeed, Prima
Paint  adheres to the notion that the FAA, though “outcome determinative,” and
thus “substantive” for purposes of the Erie  doctrine, is procedural law:  a set of
congressional rules “prescrib[ing] how federal courts are to conduct themselves”
rather than “substantive rules to govern . . . simple diversity cases[.]”  388 U.S. at 405
(emphasis added). Prima Paint  could and should have been understood as clarifying
that the Commerce Clause, no less than Article III and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, can provide the basis for a federal procedural  rule applicable in federal but
not state courts. See  Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 35-
36.
54 Southland , 465 U.S. at 15 n.9.
55 The phrase “courts of the United States” in section 3 means federal courts. See
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
n.6 (1989) (explaining that “§§ 3 and 4 . . . by their terms appear to apply only to
proceedings in federal court”).  Thus, for example, the Seventh Amendment’s ex-
plicit reference to “any Court of the United States” (stating that “no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States”) applies only
to federal courts. See, e.g. , Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S.
211, 217 (1916) (“[T]he Seventh Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts
of the United States and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials
by jury in state courts . . . .”); see also  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37
(1876) (“[R]ights . . . acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prose-
cuted in the United States courts, or in the State courts . . . .”).
56 See  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
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before Southland  that the FAA created a substantive federal
right that creates no federal question jurisdiction, the Court
transformed the FAA into “something of an anomaly in the field
of federal-court jurisdiction.”57 Southland  notes this anomaly,
and establishes it as the law, but makes no attempt to explain
why Congress would have created the anomaly or its constitu-
tional basis for doing so.58
Finally, Southland ’s holding is difficult to reconcile with the
limitation in FAA section 2, which provides that arbitration
agreements shall be deemed enforceable “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.”59  This “savings clause” makes clear that state law contract
defenses apply to arbitration agreements, as to any other con-
tracts.60  This is consistent with the recognized purpose of the
FAA to place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as
other contracts,”61 and “make arbitration agreements as enforce-
able as other contracts but not more so.”62  State legislatures’
sovereign prerogative to declare public policy has always pro-
vided a basis “at law” for “the revocation of any contract.”63
California construed its Franchise Investment Law to preclude
contractual waivers of any rights, including the right to jury trial,
in franchise contracts as a public policy to protect franchisees,
who are typically the weaker party in such bargains.  In holding
this anti-waiver provision preempted, the Southland  Court cre-
ated an apparent conflict with the FAA’s section 2 savings
clause.64
To resolve this tension, Southland  asserted that “the defense to
arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is
not a ground that exists at law or in equity ‘for the revocation of
(1983).  For early cases, see  Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc.,
62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933); In re  Woerner, 31 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1929).
57 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. , 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
58 Southland , 465 U.S. at 15 n.9.
59 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).
60 This language becomes a “savings clause”—in the sense of saving state law
from preemption—only as a result of Southland ’s general rule of preemption.  With-
out Southland  preemption, the proviso would function simply as a reminder to fed-
eral courts to apply state law contract defenses to arbitration agreements, rather
than to create federal law.
61 H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); accord  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
62 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
63 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
64 Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
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any  contract’ but merely a ground that exists for the revocation
of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the California
Franchise Investment Law.”65  But this interpretation of section
2, as will be seen, makes little sense, and has created difficulties
for later courts.
2. Judicial Coping with Southland’s Tension with FAA
Section 2
FAA section 2 should have been understood as a procedural
rule for federal courts that minimizes, even in federal court cases,
the displacement of state law, through the section 2 savings
clause.  But by holding section 2 to be substantive, Southland  dug
itself into an analytical hole, which subsequent Supreme Court
preemption decisions seem to try to escape.  In the next FAA
preemption case, Perry v. Thomas ,66 the Court invalidated a Cal-
ifornia statute that expressly preserved the right to a judicial fo-
rum for state wage and hour claims “without regard to the
existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”67  While Perry
thus involved what might be seen as a “clear” example of a law
singling out arbitration agreements for special enforcement barri-
ers, the Court took pains to identify what state law would be
saved by the proviso in FAA section 2:
Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is ap-
plicable if  that law arose to govern issues concerning the valid-
ity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.  A
state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the
fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with this requirement of § 2.  A court may not, then, in assess-
ing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement,
construe that agreement in a manner different from that in
which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under
state law.  Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agree-
ment to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that en-
forcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the
court to effect what we hold today the state legislature
cannot.68
Since Perry , the Court has reiterated that arbitration agree-
ments are not exempt from defenses that apply to other con-
tracts: “States may regulate contracts, including arbitration
65 Id . at 16-17 n.11.
66 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
67 CAL. LABOR CODE § 229 (West 2003).
68 Perry , 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (citations omitted).
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clauses, under general contract law principles.”69
Yet an ambiguity persists. Southland is now understood by
most as distinguishing between laws that “single out” or are spe-
cifically “hostile” to arbitration, and “general contract laws.”70
This attempted  “general/specific” distinction seems to be neces-
sary to reconcile Southland  with FAA section 2, but it tends to
break down because it is fundamentally incoherent.
To begin with, the distinction drives a wedge between legisla-
tive and judge-made contract law.  State legislatures do not typi-
cally legislate in the “general” terms suggested by Southland.
Instead, they focus on specific categories of contracts marked by
unequal bargaining power and other market failures: consumer
contracts, franchise agreements, and employment contracts, for
example.71  It would be inappropriate to make “one-size-fits-all”
contract rules for the fundamental reason that, in contract, one
size does not fit all.  Rules protecting an individual 7-Eleven
franchisee from overreaching by the parent Southland Corpora-
tion may be wholly unnecessary to apply to agreements between,
say, Southland Corporation and Wal-Mart.  Indeed, Southland ’s
misguided notion of “general contract law” strongly implies that
FAA preemption doctrine disfavors state legislation, compared
to state judge-made rules.72
69 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); accord  Doc-
tor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996).
70 See, e.g., Casarotto , 517 U.S. at 687 (stating that the FAA “preclude[s] States
from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status”); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d
1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the FAA preempts laws that are “hostile” to
arbitration); Goff Group v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1150 (M.D.
Ala. 2002) (same). But see  Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra  note 17, at 409-10.
71 Any state code provides numerous examples demonstrating that most contract
law is subject-specific, rather than “general.”  For example, Chapters 214 through
221 of the Wisconsin Statutes regulate a variety of business entities—banking insti-
tutions, finance companies, car dealers, collections agencies, and others—in ways
that control the terms of their contracts.  The Wisconsin legislature has created spe-
cial contracting rules to deal with insurance contracts, real estate contracts, landlord-
tenant agreements, and consumer contracts. See WIS. STAT. §§ 421-27, 631-32,
704.01-704.90, 706-09 (2003).
72 See Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the FAA
was “intended to foreclose state legislative  attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements”) (emphasis added).  To the extent that “general contract
law” means judge-made principles to the exclusion of statutory public policies,
Southland ’s distinction is reminiscent of the now-discredited view of contract law of
100 years ago, in which universal or general principles of common law were “discov-
ered” by courts and legal rules enacted by legislatures were deemed inferior and
dangerous.  This view of the law, of course, has been rejected, and wisely so, ever
since Holmes first pointed out that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipres-
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This hostility to legislated contract law shows up plainly in
Southland .  There, the law in question was, in fact, general con-
tract law, and not a law specifically targeting, or “hostile” to, ar-
bitration.  The antiwaiver provision in the California Franchise
Investment Law made void as against public policy “[A]ny . . .
provision purporting to. . . waive compliance with any provision
of this law.”73  The antiwaiver provision does not single out arbi-
tration agreements at all.  Adhesion contracts that force the
weaker party to waive rights in advance have long been disfa-
vored under the general judge-made principle that  contracts
against public policy are void.74  When a legislature attaches such
an antiwaiver provision to a statute, it does nothing more than
exercise its sovereign prerogative to declare public policy, and
thereby remind a court to apply the “void as against public pol-
icy” doctrine.  Construing a generic antiwaiver provision to pre-
clude arbitration of claims under the statute simply applies a
general contract principle to the specific instance of arbitration.
Indeed, since Southland , the Supreme Court has held that such
an antiwaiver provision does not  specifically target arbitration.75
Moreover, even seemingly “general” judge-made doctrines,
such as unconscionability, can be shown to fail a test that equates
“specific” anti-arbitration rules with any law “that takes its
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at
issue.”76  To apply unconscionability doctrine, a court always has
ence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can
be identified.”  S. Pac. Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
73 CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977) (emphasis added).
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 195 (1981).
75 In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express , 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the
Court overruled its earlier holding in Wilko v. Swan , 346 U.S. 427 (1953), to the
effect that a generic antiwaiver provision in section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77n (discussing a provision virtually identical to the one in Southland)
precluded enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate securities fraud claims.
The issue in Rodriguez  was not preemption, since a federal law was involved, but
whether the generic antiwaiver provision was evidence of a specific congressional
intent to preserve the judicial forum against arbitration agreements. See  Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (stating that the federal
statutory claim not arbitrable if Congress evinces an intent to preclude arbitration).
The Rodriguez  court determined, in essence, that the antiwaiver language does not
specifically target arbitration:  “the language prohibiting waiver . . . could easily have
been read to relate to substantive provisions of the Act” rather than arbitration.  490
U.S. at 480 (citing Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 618 n.7 (7th Cir.
1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), rev’d  417 U.S. 506 (1974)). Rodriguez  thus contra-
dicts Southland  on this key point.
76 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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to scrutinize the fairness of a particular contract term in the con-
text of the transaction between particular parties.  Perhaps an ar-
bitration agreement written to preclude class actions or punitive
damages can be held unconscionable without having that applica-
tion of unconscionability doctrine “take its meaning” from the
existence of the arbitration clause: such terms could be uncon-
scionable whether they were attached to an arbitration agree-
ment or not.  But what about a state-law principle that an
arbitration agreement is unconscionable or otherwise unenforce-
able because the obligation to arbitrate is not mutual?77  Provi-
sions holding that the drafting party has the exclusive right to
choose the arbitrator have also been held unconscionable under
general state contract law.78  These applications of unconsciona-
bility doctrine clearly “take their meaning” from the existence of
the arbitration clause.  Taking the “general/specific” distinction
to its (il)logical conclusion suggests that these applications are
preempted.
Ultimately, the “general/specific” distinction is incoherent, be-
cause nearly every general principle of contract law “takes its
meaning” from the specific contract term at issue.79  The diffi-
culty in applying the “general/specific” distinction is reflected in
the difficulty courts have had in explaining it. The Supreme
Court may have made such confusion more likely with some un-
fortunately unclear language in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson .80  In summarizing the import of the savings clause, the
Court stated:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses,
under general contract law principles and they may invalidate
an arbitration clause “upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (em-
phasis added). What States may not do is decide that a con-
tract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service,
77 See, e.g. , Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 691-92
(Cal. 2000); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va.
1998).
78 See, e.g. , Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 175-78 (Cal. 1981).
79 Defenders of Southland  preemption have taken to arguing that there is such a
thing as general contract law saved from preemption, but it happens to be limited to
“doctrines like” fraud or duress.  In other words, the FAA preempts any contract
doctrine based on actual contract terms, and saves only those contract doctrines that
go to underlying transacting behavior that is not manifested in written terms. See,
e.g. , Drahozal, FAA Preemption , supra  note 17, at 403.
80 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.81
The second sentence simply cannot mean what it sounds like.
An arbitration agreement may be unfair under general contract
law principles even if its basic terms are fair: a consumer contract
may establish a reasonable sales price, but provide that future
disputes will be arbitrated in Borneo before a panel of arbitrators
chosen by the seller, with the consumer to pay a $1 million forum
fee to arbitrate his claim.  Unconscionability doctrine recognizes
that facts creating substantive contractual unfairness may differ
not only from case to case, but also from term to term within a
single contract.  A great deal of unfairness in contracts stems not
from the basic price bargain, but from subsidiary terms buried in
the fine print—typically, terms seeking to gain an unfair advan-
tage in potential future disputes.
In implicitly striving to reconcile Southland ’s inconsistency
with the FAA, the Perry , Doctors , and Allied-Bruce  decisions
give rise to a contradiction between themselves and Southland .
If general contract law “of legislative or judicial origin” is saved
from preemption by section 2, there is no reason why  an an-
tiwaiver provision—like the one struck down in Southland  it-
self—should be preempted. Perry , Doctors , and Allied-Bruce
could not escape the analytical trap of Southland  because there is
no such thing as “general contract law” as distinct from arbitra-
tion-specific rules.  This is particularly so if “arbitration specific
rules” are understood, not as a statute’s express mention of arbi-
tration, but rather as the case-specific application of general stat-
utes or rules to an arbitration agreement.
C. Recent FAA Preemption Cases: Substantive Tort Reform
Through Procedural Regulation
Due to the internal incoherence of Southland , and its errone-
ous holding that the FAA is substantive, FAA preemption has
become a case study in the use of procedures to gain substantive
deregulatory advantages through contract.  The developing law
of the FAA is in some ways just the latest chapter in the age-old
conflict between the party who imposes and the party who sub-
mits to an adhesion contract.  The pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments which give rise to most of the objections to the FAA are
themselves virtually always found in adhesion contracts.  Draft-
81 Id . at 281.
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ers of these contracts generally have superior bargaining power
and information, engage in repeat transactions, and find the use
of form terms advantageous.  Drafters naturally try to “place a
thumb on the scales of justice” by adding contract terms which
give them advantages if disputes should arise.82  Advance waivers
of substantive rights, remedies, class actions, and jury trials, or
agreements to litigate in distant and inconvenient forums are
common examples.83  The non-drafting party—typically a con-
sumer, employee or franchisee—engages in relatively few such
transactions and is often protected from the drafters’ overreach-
ing by regulatory statutes and common law doctrines such as un-
conscionability.  Drafters have a tendency to “draft up to the
limit allowed by law” and to find innovative means to draft
around regulation.84
As the judicial appetite for “rigorously” enforcing arbitration
agreements became clearer in the 1980s and 1990s,85 adhesion
contract drafters have tried to shift these dispute resolution ad-
vantages into catch-all arbitration clauses.  A clause forcing the
consumer to waive punitive damages, which would be plainly un-
enforceable were it written “at large” in a form contract, gets
moved into an arbitration clause by providing that all disputes
between the contracting parties are to be arbitrated but the arbi-
trator cannot award punitive damages.86  A forum selection
clause requiring the Seattle, Washington consumer to litigate in
Miami, Florida may fall afoul of a state rule limiting unfair venue
82 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 598 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting contractual waivers and dispute resolution clauses “all similarly designed to
put a thumb on the [contract drafter’s] side of the scale of justice”); Schwartz, En-
forcing Small Print , supra  note 20, at 53-60; Carrington & Haagen, supra  note 7, at
336-37; Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction , 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1229 (1983) (“The use of form documents, if legally enforcea-
ble, imparts to firms . . . a freedom from legal restraint and an ability to control
relationships across a market.”).
83 See  Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping Clauses , supra  note 30, at 56-59.
84 See, e.g. , Rakoff, supra  note 82, at 1205.
85 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985))
(stating that the FAA requires that courts “rigorously enforce” arbitration agree-
ments).  For a historical outline of the emergence of the federal courts’ policy favor-
ing arbitration, see, e.g. , Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and
Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act , 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 943-56 (1999);
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print , supra  note 20, at 81-109; Jean R. Sternlight, Pan-
acea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding
Arbitration , 74 WASH U. L. Q. 637 (1996).
86 See, e.g. , PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 583 U.S. 401, 405 (2003).
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clauses, but it may be viewed under the more favorable pro-arbi-
tration lens of the FAA if it takes the form of an agreement to
arbitrate in Miami.87  Corporate defendants have had mixed suc-
cess with such “remedy-stripping” arbitration agreements.88
The issue for state law under the FAA in recent cases seeking
enforcement of such agreements is whether state contract regula-
tion designed to prevent contractual overreaching independent
of arbitration will be preempted in cases where the overreaching
contract term has been piggy-backed onto an arbitration clause.
Drafting parties have pressed two related preemption arguments
to achieve this outcome.
1. The “Enforce As Written” Rule
Compelled arbitration proponents have begun to argue that
the FAA creates a substantive federal rule of contract law that
arbitration agreements must be enforced as written , notwith-
standing any state law which may vary the effect or meaning of
specified terms.  This notion is broader than the basic, “singling
out” rule of FAA preemption, which nullifies state laws that ex-
pressly or specifically regulate or invalidate arbitration agree-
ments.89  Under the “enforce as written” concept, the drafting
party is given a federal mandate to write an arbitration agree-
ment that conflicts with state contract regulations and thereby to
preempt them.  For instance, if the arbitration clause states that
the Seattle consumer must arbitrate in Miami, a state law prohib-
iting burdensome venue clauses will be preempted by the federal
rule that the arbitration clause must be enforced as written.
The “enforce as written” rule has gained some traction in the
courts.  In Bazzle , for example, the three dissenting justices ac-
cepted the defendant’s argument that their consumer arbitration
agreement precluded class arbitrations and therefore had to be
enforced “according to [its] terms”; to the dissenters, the applica-
tion of a state law rule to vary those written terms should have
been preempted by the FAA.90  At least one scholar contends
that the FAA creates a substantive “freedom of contract” regime
87 See, e.g. , Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001), and
cases cited infra  note 111.
88 Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping Clauses , supra  note 30, at 66-74, 78-79.
89 See supra  text accompanying note 70.
90 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458-59 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 54 (1995)
(alteration in original).
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to be imposed on the states.91  But, the “enforce as written” rule
is dubious as a matter of statutory interpretation.
The argument for it apparently arises from FAA sections 3 and
4.  Section 3 provides that a district court may stay a pending
lawsuit “until . . . arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.”  Section 4 provides that a party may
petition a district court for an order “directing that such arbitra-
tion proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement” or,
further on in section 4, an order “directing the parties to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement .”92
It is something of an oddity to find in these provisions a sub-
stantive regime of freedom of contract.  In contrast to sections 1
and 2, the so-called “substantive” provisions of the FAA,93 the
Court has viewed sections 3 and 4 as procedural.  In Volt Infor-
mation Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun-
ior University , the Court was asked to consider an apparent
conflict in state and federal arbitration procedures.94  Previously,
in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd , the Court had held that,
under the FAA, a federal court must invariably stay litigation
and order arbitration to proceed first, where a single case raised
both arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues.95 Volt  raised the ques-
tion of whether the Byrd  rule applied to a proceeding in Califor-
nia state court.96  California’s controlling civil procedure statute
provides that a court has discretion to stay the arbitration and
allow the litigation of non-arbitrable claims to proceed first,
based on efficiency and fairness concerns.97  The Supreme Court
held that the federal rule did not preempt the state rule where
the parties’ arbitration agreement contained a choice-of-law
clause construed as adopting California procedural law.  The
Court concluded that the “substantive” policy of FAA section 2
did not require arbitration to precede litigation in state court
91 Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:  Contracting out of Govern-
ment’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law , 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 529, 530-31 (1994); see also  Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability
After  Doctors’ Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1006
(1996).
92 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1997) (emphasis added).
93 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477 n.6 (1989).
94 Id . at 468.
95 470 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1985).
96 Volt Info. Scis., Inc ., 489 U.S. at 470.
97 See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.2(c) (West 1998).
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where that reversal of the Byrd  rule appeared consistent with the
parties’ contractual choice.98
Language in Volt  seems supportive of a broad “enforce as writ-
ten” rule, but only if taken out of context.  The Volt  decision
stated that the FAA “requires courts to enforce privately negoti-
ated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance
with their terms” and that “parties . . . may limit by contract the
issues which they will arbitrate . . . [and] specify by contract the
rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.”99  How-
ever, parties to a contract are generally not allowed to dictate
what procedures a court will follow, and Volt  does not hold oth-
erwise.100  The Byrd  rule is plainly a procedural interpretation of
sections 3 and 4, and the Court was not at all convinced that
these procedures could be imposed on state courts: “[W]e have
never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply
only to proceedings in federal court, . . . are nonetheless applica-
ble in state court,” and the argument that they do not bind state
courts had “some merit.”101
If the “enforce as written” rule were to be pushed beyond Volt
and Mastrobuono  (which had some “enforce as written” dicta), it
could have potentially far-reaching consequences.  If it were ap-
plied to allow contract drafters to bar class actions against them-
selves, as the petitioner argued in Bazzle , this would in itself be
an extraordinary exemption from state consumer contract regula-
tion, since “[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mech-
anism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights.”102  Conceivably, the “enforce as
written” rule could also support enforcement of the sorts of waiv-
98 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc , 489 U.S. at 477–79.
99 Id.  at 478-79.
100 See infra  Part IV.B.1.  Private contracts can normally influence procedural law
only by forum selection, not by telling courts what procedures to follow.
101 Volt Info. Scis., Inc , 489 U.S. at 477, 477 n.6.  Professor Drahozal argues that
Volt  necessarily implies that the California procedural statute would have been pre-
empted by the Byrd  rule had the parties not made a choice of California procedural
law in their arbitration agreement.  Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 17, at
406.  That is not necessarily so, given the Court’s expression of doubt that procedu-
ral aspects of the FAA can bind state courts and its express determination to decline
to reach that issue.  489 U.S. at 477.  The issue is currently pending before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. See  Chronus Invs. v. Concierge Servs., 72 P.3d 1166 (Cal.
2003) (granting review).
102 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing Mace v. Van
Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)) (internal quotations omitted); see also
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ers that would be unenforceable absent an arbitration agreement
or FAA preemption.  More aggressive proponents of arbitration
agreements have pushed the argument that far.103  At its ex-
treme, a rule requiring enforcement of an agreement literally
“according to its terms” could be seen to conflict with a rule
holding that, for instance, unconscionable terms will not be en-
forced, and such a federal enforcement rule would trump the
state unconscionability rule.  Because only a federal common law
of contract defenses would withstand this preemption doctrine,
the “enforce as written” rule would effectively immunize arbitra-
tion agreements from any review whatsoever for fairness under
state law.
Whatever the basis for the “enforce as written” argument, it
must be harmonized with section 2 of the FAA, which provides
that arbitration agreements are enforceable, save upon grounds
for the revocation of any contract.  All contracts are subject to
background state contract law, which will provide, as a matter of
public policy, that certain terms cannot be enforced as written.
The recognized purpose of the FAA is to “make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more
so.”104  Therefore, the “enforce as written” rule, which would im-
munize arbitration agreements from state contract law, is incon-
sistent with section 2 of the FAA.105  On the contrary, any
dispute-control terms—including remedy-stripping clauses, bans
Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will
the Class Action Survive? , 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-33 (2000).
103 See, e.g. , W. Va. ex rel.  Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 279-80 (W. Va. 2002),
cert. denied , 537 U.S. 1087 (2002) (explaining that the drafting party argued that
FAA preempts application of state unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agree-
ment purporting to waive punitive damages); Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 129 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 393, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (suggesting that FAA preempts any departure
from enforcing arbitration agreements as written).
104 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967);
accord Volt Info. Scis., Inc , 489 U.S. at 479; H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924) (explaining that the FAA’s purpose is to place arbitration agreements “upon
the same footing as other contracts”).
105 Supporters of FAA preemption will argue that an “enforce as written” rule
flows from the so-called “substantive” language in section 2, that a written arbitra-
tion agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable.”  This entails creative
statutory interpretation that ignores the legislative history stating that arbitration
agreements will be treated like other contracts. See Drahozal, FAA Premption ,
supra  note 16.  Nothing in section 2 suggests the “as written” or “according to its
terms” language that proponents of the “enforce as written” argument purport to
rely on.  And the general notion that enforcing a contract necessarily implies enforc-
ing it “as written” or “according to its terms” begs the main question of the effect of
contract regulation.  Of course, contract enforcement usually means enforcing the
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on class actions, forum selection clauses, or arbitrator payment
provisions—that go beyond the choice of arbitration itself could
be deemed unconscionable and denied enforcement as a matter
of state law saved from preemption under section 2.106
2. The Incoherent Concept of “General” Contract Law
The Court’s efforts to harmonize Southland  with the FAA’s
section 2 savings clause have unsurprisingly led to confusion—in
the form of erroneous preemption holdings—in the lower courts.
The Court has instructed that “state law, whether of legislative or
judicial origin” is saved from preemption if it “arose to govern
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally.”107  Unfortunately, the concept of “generally
applicable contract law” lends itself to misapplication.  For exam-
ple, in Bradley v. Harris Research , the court misapplied the con-
cept to hold that a California statute barring unfair venue
provisions in franchise agreements was preempted by the
FAA.108  The court acknowledged that the state venue statute did
not single out arbitration and would have applied irrespective of
the presence of an arbitration agreement.  But the court never-
theless concluded that “general” contract law under Doctors As-
sociates  means a law that applies to every  contract, whereas the
California statute “applies only to forum selection clauses and
only to franchise agreements; it therefore does not apply to ‘any
contract.’”109  Accordingly, the court held the venue statute pre-
empted by the FAA.110
A growing number of cases make the same error made by the
Bradley  court, and thereby threaten to undermine broad swaths
of state contract regulation.111  Like the purported federal “en-
written terms, but, again, contract regulation makes certain terms not enforceable as
written.
106 Furthermore, even if certain remedy-stripping clauses were enforced, the ef-
fect should not be the loss of substantive rights and remedies.  If the arbitration
agreement says that punitive damages should not be awarded, the plaintiff could
well be entitled to have her punitive damage claim heard in court after the arbitra-
tion. See  Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping Clauses , supra  note 30, at 90-99.
107 Perry v. Thomas, 489 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); accord Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
108 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001).
109 Id . at 890; see Doctor’s Assocs., Inc ., 517 U.S. at 681.
110 275 F.3d at 893.
111 See  Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the provi-
sion of the California consumer protection statute prohibiting contractual waiver of
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force as written” rule, Bradley ’s application of the “general/spe-
cific” distinction would have the effect of turning arbitration
agreements into blanket exemptions from consumer protection
and other statutes aimed at preventing contractual overreaching.
An arbitration agreement could be written to mandate a waiver
of injunctive relief, compensatory damages, or attorney fees
guaranteed by a state consumer or antidiscrimination statute.
Because those statutes do not apply to every  contract and are not
“general contract law,” as construed by Bradley , they would be
preempted and the arbitration agreement “enforced as written”
under the Bradley  analysis.
Bradley  breathes new life into Southland ’s error, despite the
Supreme Court’s post-Southland  move away from it, that there
are general contract defenses wholly distinct from statutes creat-
ing public policies as to specific categories of contracts.  But leg-
islatures deal with specific problems, not abstractions, and
therefore the vast majority of state contract legislation targets
specified categories of contracts rather than “all contracts.”
Longstanding “general” contract law holds that “[a] promise or
other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of pub-
lic policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable.”112  Like-
wise, seemingly “general” judge-made contract defenses take
their meaning from application to specific factual settings.  A
court is no more likely than is a legislature to find the need to
apply protective doctrines like unconscionability to agreements
freely negotiated between, say, Bank of America and Citibank,
yet both the court and the legislature might well seek to apply an
unconscionability protection to an individual consumer doing
business with either of those firms.113 Bradley ’s erroneous rea-
soning would apply Southland ’s general/specific distinction to
class action remedy is preempted because consumer protection statute is not “gen-
eral contract law”); KKW Enters. v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising
Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that FAA preempts venue provision in
state franchise law); Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir.
1998) (same); Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., 566 S.E.2d 730 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
113 The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in some form in 49
states, is about as “general” as contract law gets. See  1 STEWART MACAULAY ET
AL., CONTRACTS:  LAW IN ACTION 37 (1995).  Yet even the U.C.C. would fail the
“test” for generality adopted in Bradley  and similar cases.  The U.C.C. does not
apply to “all contracts”—even taking all nine of its articles together—but rather is
limited to “certain” commercial transactions.  See U.C.C. preamble, reprinted in
CONTRACT LAW:  SELECTED COURSE MATERIALS 7 (Steven J. Burton & Melvin A.
Eisenberg, eds. 2002).  The limited scope of the U.C.C. is even more apparent when
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preempt virtually all state contract law where an arbitration
agreement is involved.114
II
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE STATE
COURT PROCEDURES: UNREMOVED CASES
The notion that Congress may control state court procedures
finds scant support within the constitutional text.  This section
considers whether Congress has the power to control state court
procedures for “unremoved” cases in state courts.  Federal juris-
diction is present in such cases, either because the case pleads a
federal question or because the parties are diverse, but the par-
ties have consented to the jurisdiction of the state court—the
plaintiff by electing to file in state court, and the defendant by
declining to remove to federal court.115  Supreme Court decisions
considering the question have viewed the power of Congress
over state court procedure as a limited exception to a general
rule of state sovereignty over their own courts, existing only
viewing its various articles separately: Article Two of the U.C.C., of course, limits its
scope to transactions in goods. See  U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977).
114 Professor Drahozal, defending decisions like Bradley , argues that the general/
specific distinction is dictated by the “plain language” of the “savings clause” of
FAA section 2, which provides for arbitration clauses to be invalidated on “such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any  contract.”  Drahozal,
FAA Preemption , supra  note 17, at 409-11; accord  Stephen J. Ware, Contractual
Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury Trial Rights , 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 47 (2003).  Clearly, it is overselling the point to suggest that “any
contract” plainly means “all contracts.”  True enough, “any” can  mean “all or
every,” but it can also mean “one out of many.” See, e.g. , OXFORD AMERICAN DIC-
TIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 31 (1999); JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 205 (8th ed., 3d. rev. 1914).  Thus, the
“singling out” interpretation is consistent with the statute’s plain language.
Drahozal argues further that the “singling out” interpretation of the FAA is incon-
sistent with Southland .  Drahozal, FAA Preemption , supra  note 17, at 410.  So it is,
but it derives from Perry , Allied-Bruce , and Casarotto .  If those cases are inconsis-
tent with Southland  on this point, as I argue they are, then they should supersede
Southland .  To sustain his argument, Professor Drahozal would have to explain why
those three cases should not be controlling.  Professor Drahozal’s better argument is
that the “singling out” interpretation leaves open the possibility that states could
effectively opt out of the FAA by enacting a general law, such as the New Mexico
“disabling civil dispute clause” statute, barring in general terms any contractual
waivers of procedural safeguards.  Drahozal, FAA Preemption , supra  note 17, at
410; see, e.g. , N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1(b)(4) (Michie 1978).  That may be true,
yet his alternative is equally questionable, because it renders the section 2 savings
clause a virtual nullity, and would effectively allow parties to opt out of most state
contract law that would touch on an arbitration agreement.
115 See infra  note 165.
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where a federal procedure is bound up with a federal substantive
right.  It appears that while Congress may create substantive law
that state courts must apply as rules of decision without discrimi-
nating against the federal right, states remain sovereign over the
structure and procedures of their courts.
A. Starting Point: State Sovereignty and Constitutional Silence
Two constitutional principles form the starting point for analy-
sis of the question of whether Congress has the power to regulate
state court procedure.  First, a state’s authority over the structure
and procedure of its own court system is a fundamental attribute
of state sovereignty: “Through the structure of its government,
and the character of those who exercise government authority, a
State defines itself as a sovereign.”116  Second, the grant of enu-
merated powers to the national government implies the contin-
ued existence of a “[r]esidual state sovereignty,” an implication
which “was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment.”117  In
the absence of an express or implied waiver of sovereignty by the
states over their court systems, or grant of power to Congress,
the states’ control over their own court procedures must be seen
as part of their residual sovereignty.  These two principles will be
discussed in turn.
Procedure is important.  One shouldn’t be misled by the fact
that many procedural rules extend to such mundane matters as
how many interrogatories may be served in pre-trial discovery in
a civil case.  Procedural questions fundamentally concern the al-
location of the state’s decision-making power to courts.  This al-
location question is an instance of the most basic question of
constitution-making—“deciding who decides”—and therefore
goes to the very heart of government sovereignty.118  How proce-
dural systems are structured also determines the nature of justice
that is delivered.119  These attributes of procedure no doubt un-
derlie the consistently recognized principle that sovereign gov-
116 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1990).
117 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 914, 919 (1997); see generally LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
118 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-5 (1994).
119 See, e.g. , William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure ,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1911 (2002) (explaining that the “design and implemen-
tation of the [procedural] systems themselves” have greater impact on equality for
participants than external constitutional norms).
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ernments in the federal system control their own procedural
systems: Questions of procedure “belong[ ] to the discretion of
every government, consulting its own interest and conven-
ience.”120
The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated as axiomatic the
notion that states are sovereign over the structure, jurisdiction,
and procedure of their court systems.  A unanimous Court in
Johnson v. Fankell  recently declared, “We have made it quite
clear that it is a matter for each State to decide how to structure
its judicial system.”121  Over a century earlier, the Court likewise
stated, “[U]ndoubtedly, a state may regulate at pleasure the
modes of proceeding in its courts.”122  As will be explored fur-
ther below, the Supremacy Clause requirement “that a state
court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the
land does not necessarily include a requirement that the State
create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal
claim is presented.”123  The general rule, “bottomed deeply in be-
lief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure,
is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.”124
120 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1987) (quoting 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 462-63 (2d ed. 1832)).  The framers recognized
that courts are an integral part of any sovereign government, and therefore state
courts were an integral part of the states’ sovereignty that would be maintained in
the constitutional scheme.  Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALIST NO. 82:
[T]he States will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclu-
sively delegated to the federal head . . . [And] I shall lay it down as a rule
that the State courts will retain  the jurisdiction they now have, unless it
appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated models.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 492  (Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961); see  Parmet, supra
note 13, at 45-47.
121 520 U.S. 911, 923 n.13.
122 Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 315 (1843); accord  Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (“The states thus have great latitude to establish the struc-
ture and jurisdiction of their own courts.”); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177,
195 (1960) (“Without any doubt it rests with each State to prescribe the jurisdiction
of its appellate courts, the mode and time of invoking that jurisdiction, and the rules
of practice to be applied in its exercise.”); Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) (“[T]he procedure by which rights may be
enforced and wrongs remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and con-
trol.”); In re Tarble, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407-08 (1871) (“How [state and federal
governments’] respective laws shall be endacted [sic]; how they shall be carried into
execution; and in what tribunals , or by what officers . . . are matters subject to their
own control, and in the regulation of which neither can interfere with the other.”)
(emphasis added).
123 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997).
124 Howlett , 496 U.S. at 372 (quoting Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law , 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)); see Wolfe , 364 U.S. at 195
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Absent from the Constitution’s grant of enumerated powers to
Congress is any general power to regulate the judiciaries of the
several states.  This absence is striking, given the centrality in the
Constitution of state courts in handling not only interstate judi-
cial business arising under state law, but also (unless and until
lower federal courts were created) most federal judicial business
as well.125
Where the Constitution grants Congress general authority to
regulate a court system, the Constitution speaks of a power to
“constitute” or “ordain and establish” “Tribunals” or “Courts”
that are “inferior” to the Supreme Court.126  These are plainly
federal courts.  According to Chief Justice Marshall, “state courts
are not, in any sense of the word, inferior  courts . . . because they
emanate from a different authority, and are the creatures of a
distinct government.”127
(explaining that states’ control over their own court structure, procedure and juris-
diction “are no less applicable when federal rights are in controversy than when the
case turns entirely upon questions of local or general law”).
125 The framers contemplated that state courts would handle a significant quantity
of federal judicial business. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra  note 120, at 492-95;
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism , 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 2012-
18 (1993).  This understanding is implicit in the “judges clause” taken together with
“vesting clause,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  Under these, state judges must apply
federal law as rules of decision in cases before them, while Congress need not create
any lower federal courts to hear federal law cases.  The framers also provided for
cohesion in the national network of state judiciaries for state law business.  For ex-
ample, the inclusion within the federal judicial power of state law diversity cases—a
category of federal jurisdiction that was implicitly understood to be non-exclusive—
itself implied an understanding that such interstate causes would form a part of state
judicial business. See  Weinberg, supra  note 13, at 757-59.  And under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, a state court was forbidden from discriminating against out-
of-state litigants. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see  Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens
of Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law , 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 261-62 (1992).
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 1.
127 Ex parte  Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97 (1807); see , e.g. , Minneapolis & St.
Louis. R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916) (explaining that the
Supremacy Clause requirement that state courts hear federal cases “in no sense im-
plied . . . that, for the purpose of enforcing the right, the state court was to be treated
as a Federal court, deriving its authority not from the state creating it, but from the
United States”); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 442 (7th ed.
1851) (state courts have an “inherent jurisdiction” to hear federal cases, but “do not
become inferior courts in the sense of the constitution, because they are not or-
dained by congress”).  It has almost never been seriously suggested that the “infer-
ior” courts which Congress was authorized to create included state courts.  Professor
Prakash has suggested, rather ambiguously, that “some framers thought that Con-
gress could constitute state courts as inferior federal courts.” See  Prakash, supra
note 125, at 2007.  Prakash makes the interesting observation that nothing in the
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Equally significant is the Constitution’s failure to grant the Su-
preme Court appellate authority over state court decisions on
matters of state law, even though such an authority could pro-
mote a national interest in uniformity of decision.128  The Su-
preme Court does, of course, exercise supervisory jurisdiction
over state courts in federal question cases, but even here the
states’ procedural and jurisdictional autonomy is apparent.  In
Cohens v. Virginia , for example, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned
that Supreme Court review of federal law decisions in state court
was needed precisely because federal questions were otherwise
“confided . . . to the State Courts, however they may be consti-
tuted.”129  Marshall assumed that state courts deciding federal is-
sues were, but for Supreme Court review, “independent,” hence
the need to impose uniformity.130
Constitution prevents a sitting state judge from contemporaneously holding a life-
tenured federal judgeship.  As with other scholars asserting a federal power to com-
mandeer certain state officers, Prakash assumes that the Supremacy Clause’s re-
quirement that state judges apply federal law authorizes “commandeering” of state
court judges to that extent.  However, Prakash stops short of claiming that Con-
gress’s arguable power to commandeer state judges or to “constitute” an inferior
court meant a congressional power to create a state court to hear federal cases or a
power to dictate procedure to a state court. See id . at 2032.
It might be said that the power to create a court includes a power to establish both
its jurisdiction and procedure.  Congress’s power over lower federal court procedure
can be seen as flowing from the power to create such courts.  Congress, of course,
was not given power to create jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see  Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), though Congress gains power to create pro-
cedures and limit the constitutionally-created appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under the Exceptions and Regulations Clause. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
128 See  Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (declining to
recognize any power of Supreme Court to review state law decisions from state
courts); Hart, supra  note 124, at 499-500.
129 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415 (1821).
130 “‘Thirteen independent Courts,’ says a very celebrated statesman, (and we
have now more than twenty such Courts,) ‘of final jurisdiction over the same causes,
arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but con-
tradiction and confusion can proceed.’” Id . at 415-16.
Indeed, state courts are empowered to render independent interpretations of fed-
eral law, and are bound by U.S. Supreme Court, but not lower federal court, prece-
dents. See  ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Lower federal courts exercise no
direct appellate review over state court decisions in federal question cases.  The
Rooker-Feldman  doctrine, which bars direct review by lower federal courts of state
court decisions, is technically based on an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, author-
izing Supreme Court review of state decisions, but the constitutional dimension to
the ruling lurks plainly in the background. See  Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  Finally, the adequate-
state-ground doctrine, under which the Supreme Court will not review cases raising
federal questions where the state courts have disposed of them on adequate state
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The closest the Constitution comes to authorizing Congress to
determine modes of proceeding in state courts is the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, allowing Congress “by general Laws [to] pre-
scribe the Manner in which [sister state] Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved.”131  Under this clause, Congress can
regulate to some degree the procedural questions of the effect of
judgments of one state’s court in another, as well as rules gov-
erning the choice of law in state courts.132  However, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause’s specific constitutional mandates in-
volve coordination of state authority vis-à-vis each other, rather
than between the federal and state sovereigns, and are a far cry
from a general power over state court procedures.  In sum, the
Constitution impinges on state court structure only by superim-
posing Supreme Court review over state court determinations of
federal law questions.
B. Possible Constitutional Sources of an Implied Congressional
Power over State Courts
Can any generalized congressional authority to direct state
court procedures be inferred from other constitutional provi-
sions, or from its “structure” or “essential postulate[s]”?133  In
the absence of a grant of such authority, the Constitution’s feder-
alist structure, particularly as articulated in the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism cases in the past decade, weighs heavily
against the idea.  I can conceive of five possible sources of a gen-
eral congressional authority over state court procedure.  The
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause suggest arguments that Congress has a direct power to
regulate state procedures even for state law claims; these argu-
ments are considered below, in section III.134
law grounds, “accords respect to state courts as decisionmakers by honoring their
modes of procedure.”  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990).
131 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  Similarly, but even narrower in scope, is the Extradi-
tion Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, which allows some federal statutory coor-
dination of detention and prosecution of criminal defendants. See Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1987).
132 See, e.g. , Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988).  There is consider-
able debate over the extent of Congress’s power under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to legislate nationwide choice-of-law rules. See, e.g.,  Laycock, supra  note
125, at 252-55; Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Over-
extension of Congressional Authority , 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1450-51, 1451 n.78
(1997).  However, this question is outside the scope of this Article.
133 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 914, 918 (1997).
134 Again, the “Full Faith and Credit” and “Extradition” Clauses are expressly
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The discretionary “vesting” clause, the Supremacy Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause, either separately or in some
combination, suggest arguments that Congress has an implied
power over state procedure that follows from its power to make
substantive law applicable in state court.  These arguments will
be considered in the immediately following subsections.
1. Constitutional Structure—The Supremacy and Vesting
Clauses
The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby , any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.135
The italicized “judges clause,” read in the context of the whole
Supremacy Clause, establishes two principles relevant here.
First, it forms a powerful choice-of-law rule by which state judges
must follow applicable federal law in cases before it, superseding
or preempting any conflicting state law.  Second, it reaffirms
what is implicit in the discretionary “vesting” clause of Article
III, that state courts must keep their doors open to federal sub-
stantive claims and defenses.
It has never seriously been argued that the Supremacy Clause
is itself an affirmative grant of legislative authority to Congress
to control state courts; rather, any federal statute binding on
state courts must be duly enacted according to one of Congress’s
limited in their scope, and do not confer such a general power. See supra  note 131
and accompanying text.  Perhaps it could be argued that the Guaranty Clause is
another source of congressional authority over state court procedures.  The argu-
ment would be that a judicial branch is a fundamental part of republican govern-
ment, and Congress can legislate to enforce the republican guarantee.  Yet
republican state government also presumes state autonomy from congressional con-
trol over matters concerning government structure. See  Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:  Federalism for a Third Century , 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1988).  If Congress may regulate any state government structures
under the Guaranty Clause, presumably it could do so only at the extremes—for
example, if a state were to impose a monarchy or dictatorship and dispense with
elections. See id .  Thus, a Guaranty Clause power over state court systems might
come into play were a state to abolish its courts entirely.  If such a power exists, it
would, I believe, fold into the Due Process Clause.  Therefore, I will not consider the
Guaranty Clause separately.
135 U.S. CONST. art VI., cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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enumerated powers.136  The strongest argument for federal con-
trol over state court procedure is based on the Supremacy Clause
and the discretionary “vesting” clause.  Under that argument, the
supremacy of federal law, the requirement that state judges apply
it, and the expectation that state courts will carry a significant
part of any federal law caseload, together authorize Congress to
treat state courts as federal courts when hearing federal cases;
federal substantive law would carry federal procedure in train
into state court.  The Supremacy Clause would thereby authorize
Congress to “commandeer” state courts and make them de facto
federal courts when hearing federal claims.  In other words, Con-
gress could control the structure and procedure of state courts
hearing federal law cases.
This argument is dubious.  As argued above, the “inferior
courts” referred to in the vesting clause are federal, not state,
courts.  It stands the discretionary character of the vesting clause
on its head to say that, by failing to create federal courts, Con-
gress exercises an arguably greater power to reconstitute state
courts as federal courts.  Nor does the obligation of a state court
to apply federal law imply any diminution of state sovereignty
over how those courts are constituted.  On the contrary, the
framers recognized that the power of state courts to apply federal
law follows from their preexisting jurisdiction.137  Thus, Hamilton
argued that state courts will necessarily have “a concurrent juris-
diction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it is
not expressly prohibited,” precisely because “[t]he judiciary
power of every government” includes the power to apply the
substantive law of any sovereign that may be applicable to a dis-
pute before it.138  As seen in the following sections, the fact that
federal substantive law provides a mandatory rule of decision for
state courts does not support the argument that Congress can
thereby commandeer state courts by controlling their procedure.
2. The Supreme Court’s Approach: Testa and Commandeering
The Supreme Court has examined the Supremacy Clause as a
136 See, e.g. , Printz , 521 U.S. at 925.  Some commentators have argued that Printz
gives such a broad reading to the Supremacy Clause, not because they believe fed-
eral supremacy is so broad, but to criticize Printz .  This reading of Printz  seems
improbable in light of its holding limiting congressional authority to commandeer
state officials. See  Bellia, supra  note 13, at 974.
137 See  Parmet, supra  note 13, at 45-47.
138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra  note 120, at 492.
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source of congressional authority to require state officials to im-
plement federal law, in a trio of cases that have been associated
with the concept of federal “commandeering” of actors within
each of the three branches of state government.  In New York v.
United States ,139 the Court invalidated a provision of a federal
radioactive waste statute that required states either to regulate in
a particular way, or else to “assume the liabilities of certain state
residents,” either of which would require legislative action and
thereby “‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of
federal regulatory purposes.”140  Therefore, “[w]hether one views
the take title provision as lying outside Congress’ enumerated
powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty re-
served by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent
with the federal structure of our Government established by the
Constitution.”141  In Printz v. United States ,142 two local sheriffs
challenged a provision of a federal gun control statute that re-
quired them to perform certain administrative and investigative
functions in connection with federally-required background
checks for purchasers of handguns.143  The Court struck down
the challenged provision on the ground that Congress “cannot
circumvent” the anti-commandeering rule of New York “by con-
scripting the State’s officers directly” to carry out a federal direc-
tive or regulatory program.144 New York  and Printz  thus
establish that Congress cannot “commandeer” state legislative or
executive officials, notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause.
Some judges and commentators maintain that state courts can
be commandeered, despite New York  and Printz,145 based on the
principle derived from Testa v. Katt.146  In Testa , a state court
dismissed a federal action seeking a civil penalty, relying on the
traditional conflict-of-laws principle that a court need not en-
139 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
140 Id . at 175.
141 Id . at 177.
142 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
143 Id . at 902-04; Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,
107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
144 Printz , 521 U.S. at 935.
145 See, e.g. , id . at 968 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Martin H. Redish & Steven G.
Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of
Judicial Federalism , 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 75 (1998); Evan H. Caminker, State Sover-
eignty and Subordinacy:  May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement
Federal Law? , 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1036-38 (1995).
146 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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force the penal laws of another, or “foreign” sovereign.  The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause
overrides this conflict-of-laws principle, in that it makes federal
law “as much the policy of [the state] as if the act had emanated
from [that state’s] own legislature.”147  Therefore, a federal claim
must be heard in any state court “hav[ing] jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate” it.148
It is thus argued that the Testa  principle allows Congress to com-
mandeer state courts, in that “state courts of appropriate jurisdic-
tion must occupy themselves adjudicating [federal] claims . . .
regardless of how otherwise crowded their dockets might be with
state-law matters.”149
But it is a mistake to view the applicability of federal law in
state court as an example of commandeering. Testa ’s reference
to courts of “appropriate jurisdiction” implies a lack of congres-
sional power to force courts to change their jurisdiction or struc-
ture to accommodate federal claims.  The Supreme Court has
unanimously recognized that Testa ’s “requirement that a state
court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the
land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that the
State create a court competent to hear the case in which the fed-
eral claim is presented.”150  Indeed, Testa  is a continuation of a
long-standing line of cases which take pains to point out that in
imposing federal law on state courts through the Supremacy
Clause, Congress “had not attempted ‘to enlarge or regulate the
jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes of
procedure.’”151  Thus, the Testa  principle is fundamentally a non-
147 Id . at 392 (quoting Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co.,
223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)).
148 Testa , 330 U.S. at 394.
149 Printz , 521 U.S. at 967 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority’s imprecise for-
mulation of Testa  could be read to understand Testa  to mean nothing more than the
relatively narrow duty “to apply federal law in cases that the states have consented
to entertain.” Id .
150 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990), quoted in  Johnson v. Fankell, 520
U.S. 911, 919 (1997).
151 Howlett , 496 U.S. at 373 (quoting Mondou , 223 U.S. at 56; see  Minneapolis &
St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916) (explaining that a state
court is required to hear federal claim “if only the authority to enforce such right
comes generally within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the government
creating” the state court); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (explaining
that federal claims are cognizable in state court “competent to decide rights of the
like character and class”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 415 (1821)
(explaining that other than Supreme Court review, federal claims are decided in
state courts “however they may be constituted”).
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discrimination principle.152  The “judges’ clause,” as interpreted
by Testa ’s non-discrimination principle, means that state courts
must hear federal claims to the extent that they are already set
up to hear like state claims.153
Testa ’s supremacy principle, requiring state courts to remain
open to federal claims on a non-discriminatory basis, is not com-
mandeering in the relevant sense: it does not require an arm of
state government to regulate its citizens in a particular way.  The
Testa  line of cases is quite consistent with the principle underly-
ing Printz  and New York,  that federal supremacy means the
power of Congress to regulate the people, but not necessarily the
power to act directly on the states.154  In contrast, for Congress to
dictate rules of court structure, procedure and jurisdiction would
amount to commandeering in this sense.  Rules of procedure reg-
ulate the conduct of litigants qua litigants.  A congressional di-
rective to change a state court procedure is not simply a
command to apply existing state judicial resources to enforce a
152 See, e.g. ,  Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363
(1952) (citing Testa  for proposition that state may not “single out” an aspect of fed-
eral question for differential treatment); Daan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal
Rights Against States :  Alden and Federalism Non-Sense , 49 AM. U. L. REV. 611, 647
n.271 (2000); Caminker, supra  note 145, at 1030 n.110; Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III:  Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction , 65
B.U. L. REV. 205, 255 n.165 (1985).
153 Thus, the Court has recognized neutral jurisdictional limitations as a “valid
excuse” to decline to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims. See  Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117 (1945) (upholding state court determination that its “city court” lacked
jurisdiction to hear federal FLSA claim arising outside its geographical jurisdiction);
Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (uphold-
ing state court’s discretionary dismissal of FELA action where neither plaintiff nor
defendant resided in forum state); see also  Missouri ex rel . S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield,
340 U.S. 1 (1950) (upholding state court dismissal of FELA case on forum non con-
veniens  grounds); Caminker, supra  note 145, at 1025.
154 See  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1992); Printz , 521 U.S. at
920. Testa  reasoned that:
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Consti-
tution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the States, and
thereby established a policy for all.  That policy is as much the policy of
[the state] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should
be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.
330 U.S. at 392 (quoting Mondou , 223 U.S. at 57).  This language is ambiguous
enough to support a commandeering argument only if one takes it out of context.  In
Mondou , the Court held that the Supremacy Clause required state courts to apply
the substantive provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.  223 U.S. at 57.
Signficantly, the FELA is substantive regulation of individuals, not states, and the
Mondou  court made clear that state courts applying the FELA retain their auton-
omy over jurisdiction and procedure. Id . at 56. Testa ’s reference to “appropriate
jurisdiction” implies the same.
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federal right, but a directive to state courts to regulate persons in
the state—litigants—in a particular way.
Moreover, controlling procedure and jurisdiction differs signif-
icantly from imposing a choice of substantive law on a court.
Codes of procedure come directly either from state legislatures,
from courts in a quasi-legislative rulemaking capacity, or from
state constitutions.  Likewise, the creation of a court and the defi-
nition of its jurisdiction are in the first instance legislative or con-
stitutional acts, rather than judicial acts.  To assert control over
procedure or jurisdiction, Congress would have to commandeer
the state’s legislative or constitutional process.  Congressional
control over state procedure thus seems to be the very sort of
commandeering condemned in Printz  and New York.  Wherever
the Court now finds itself on its continuing “unsteady path” of
Tenth Amendment decisions, it is clear that federalism principles,
whether located in the Tenth Amendment or elsewhere, protect
the states’ sovereignty over such state governmental processes
from commandeering.155
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause and “Reverse-Erie”
Doctrine
As suggested by the anti-commandeering principle, the
Supremacy Clause requirement that state courts apply substan-
155 New York,  505 U.S. at 160. New York  and Printz  both disclaimed reliance on
the Tenth Amendment. New York, 505 U.S. at 156; Printz,  521 U.S. at 923-24.
However, the Court more recently recast those decisions by stating that “[i]n New
York and Printz , we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legis-
lative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the prin-
ciples of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.”  Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S.
141, 149 (2000).
The “unsteady path” to which New York  referred involved the question of
whether Congress could make state governments subject to “generally applicable
laws.”  This question came up repeatedly in the context of whether the state, as
employer, was subject to federal minimum wage/maximum hour laws under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. See  Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (yes); Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Wirtz) (no); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat’l League of Cit-
ies) (yes).  It now appears settled that Congress can regulate state governments in
the same manner as private parties under “generally applicable laws.” See  Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding application of Drivers’ Privacy Protection
Act to states).  However, the notion that it is constitutionally problematic for Con-
gress to regulate “the states as states” or interfere with fundamental state govern-
mental processes, arising from the short-lived National League  line of cases, seems
not to have completely died away:  perhaps it has found its final expression in the
anticommandeering doctrine of Printz  and New York .
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tive  federal law does not imply a power to impose procedural
law.  Could it be argued that the effective implementation of sub-
stantive federal mandates by state courts implies some control
over the manner of implementation?  Put another way, does the
Necessary and Proper Clause allow Congress to control state
procedure for unremoved federal question cases?  A simple ex-
ample illustrates the problem.  Imagine Congress enacting a stat-
ute requiring state courts to give trial-setting priority to federal
question cases: Here is a general procedure designed to further
the federal interest in resolution of federal law disputes across
the board.  What could be more central to “supremacy” of fed-
eral law than a rule that federal law always goes to the head of
the line in state court?
But this suggestion has been rejected—and rightly so—
throughout the history of Supreme Court statements on the mat-
ter.  The Court has been remarkably consistent in adhering to
“[t]he general rule, ‘bottomed deeply in belief in the importance
of state control of state judicial procedure . . . that federal law
takes the state courts as it finds them.’”156  The implications of
the anti-commandeering doctrine—that Congress would imper-
missibly commandeer state courts by dictating rules of procedure
and jurisdiction to them—reinforces this view.
The Court unanimously ruled in favor of state sovereignty in
Johnson v. Fankell , a case which presents in sharp relief a distinct
conflict between a strong argument for applying federal procedu-
ral law to a state court’s adjudication of a federal right and the
state’s interest in controlling its own court system.157  In Johnson ,
the Idaho courts applied state appellate procedure to deny the
defendant state officials an interlocutory appeal from the trial
court’s denial of summary judgment on their qualified immunity
defense.158  Under Mitchell v. Forsyth ,159 a district court order
denying a qualified immunity defense prior to final judgment—
whether on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment—is immediately appealable on an interlocutory basis.
The practical implications of this federal procedural right are
quite significant: the plaintiff’s pretrial case preparation through
discovery is stayed while the defendant takes one appeal as of
156 Howlett , 496 U.S. at 372 (quoting Hart, supra  note 124, at 508); accord  John-
son v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919 (1997).
157 520 U.S. 911.
158 Id . at 919.
159 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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right to the federal courts of appeals, and may even petition for
certiorari.  The Mitchell  doctrine holds that a valid qualified im-
munity defense carries in tow the important procedural right not
to have to submit to the burden of pretrial litigation, particularly
discovery processes, which cost time and money.160  Under
Mitchell , this procedural right is so important that the possibility
of correcting an erroneous denial of the sovereign immunity de-
fense is deemed to outweigh the cost to the plaintiff’s ability to
prove his substantive claim: a cost measured in loss of evidence
due to what might be years of delay during appeal.161  The John-
son  defendants argued that the right to interlocutory appeal was
bound up with their substantive federal defense of qualified im-
munity, and that the Idaho rule barring interlocutory appeal was
therefore preempted because it interfered with their federal
right.162
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected that argument.  The
Court reasoned that the “normal presumption against pre-emp-
tion” was “buttressed” by the compelling federalism interest in
allowing states to control their own judicial procedures; the
Idaho courts’ dismissal of the interlocutory appeal “rested
squarely on a neutral state rule regarding the administration of
the state courts.”163  “‘[P]rinciples [that] are fundamental to a
system of federalism’” outweighed the defendant’s argument
that their federal rights would justify “requir[ing] a State to un-
dertake something as fundamental as restructuring the operation
of its courts.”164  Thus, as Johnson  makes clear, federal
160 The Johnson  Court’s correct assumption that this right is procedural notwith-
standing its substantial practical value, weighs heavily against the notion that the
FAA—which also provides a right to avoid pre-trial litigation—is substantive. See
infra  Part IV.A.2.
161 This cost to the plaintiff should not be minimized.  If denial of qualified immu-
nity is affirmed on appeal, an average of two years will have elapsed prior to re-
mand.  If the defendant petitions for certiorari—unsuccessfully—another six months
is likely to be added.  During this time, witnesses’ memories will fade and documen-
tary and tangible evidence may be lost.  These cannot be preserved by depositions or
other discovery, which are stayed on appeal absent unusual circumstances.  The loss
of evidence tends to hurt the plaintiff, as the party bearing the burden of proof.
162 In terms of the limited precedents for imposing federal procedures on state
courts, defendants’ argument was that the interlocutory appeal right was “part and
parcel” of the substantive federal defense. See infra  text accompanying notes 164-
70.
163 Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997).
164 Id . at 922 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)).  The Court
threw in the additional point that the interlocutory appeal right was not based on
§ 1983, but on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This argument, which seems to be something of a
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supremacy of substantive law stops short of permitting Congress
to override neutral rules of state procedure or judicial adminis-
tration.  The illustrative “federal priority” rule would no doubt
be held unconstitutional, and properly so.
While there are exceptions to the general rule that “federal
law takes the state courts as it finds them,” these exceptions have
such a sketchy, limited quality that they underscore the vigor of
the rule.  The case law suggests three ways in which Congress
may influence the procedural aspects of federal rights heard in
state courts—the so-called “reverse-Erie” question.165  First, it
seems apparent that remedies deemed necessary to the enforce-
ment of a federal right—punitive damages in connection with a
Title VII claim, for example—would no doubt apply in state
court.  Likewise, a federal statute establishing a statute of limita-
tions for a particular federal claim would bind state courts.  This
is so even though, traditionally, “matters respecting the rem-
edy—such as the form of the action, sufficiency of the pleadings,
rules of evidence, and the statute of limitations—depend upon
the law of the place where the suit is brought.”166
makeweight, is overly formalistic, and not completely accurate.  The construction of
§ 1291 to allow interlocutory appeal of the specific qualified immunity defense in
§ 1983 cases is based on policies flowing from a defendant’s rights in § 1983 cases.
The more important point is that the procedural right incident to the substantive
federal defense was not sufficient to outweigh the state’s sovereign interest in struc-
turing its own court procedure.
165 Concurrent jurisdiction, rather than exclusive federal court jurisdiction, is
probably the norm for federal rights of action, and Testa  compels state courts to
entertain such federal claims in their courts of competent jurisdiction.  But nothing
compels parties to maintain their federal cases in state court, and, between the plain-
tiff’s right to file federal claims in federal court, see  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), and the
defendants’ right to remove such cases, see  28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000), federal ques-
tions in state court are somewhat exceptional.  Combine that with the broad similar-
ity between state and federal procedures, and there will be relatively few occasions
for the Supreme Court to decide how state courts are to proceed when handling
federal questions.
166 Cent. Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915). In the conceptual vocabulary
of earlier times, it appears that “remedy” and “procedure” were essentially congru-
ent—either synonymous, or at least overlapping concepts.  For example, as ex-
pressed in a contemporary conflict of laws text:  “[A]n important distinction arises
between what are called matters of right and matters of remedy, or matters of sub-
stance and matters of procedure . . . .  Matters of remedy, or procedure, then, are
determined by the law of the forum.” GOODRICH, HERBERT FUNK, HANDBOOK ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 157, 159 (1927), quoted in  Walter Wheeler Cook, “Sub-
stance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws , 42 YALE L.J. 333, 334-35 (1933).
Compare  Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1924) (Brandeis,
J.,) (“The [New York] Arbitration Law deals merely with the remedy in the state
courts . . . .  It does not attempt either to modify the substantive maritime law or to
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Second, a limited number of questions that have been tradi-
tionally viewed as matters of “procedure” or “remedy” may be
so closely related to the definition of the federal right—so
“bound up with substance”—that the federal rule would apply in
state court.  The leading case for this exception is generally taken
to be Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.167  In
Dice , the defendant sought dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) on the
ground that the plaintiff had signed a release, while the plaintiff
argued that the release was procured by fraud and, therefore,
void.168  Under Ohio procedure, the question of whether a re-
lease is vitiated by fraud is a question of equity, to be decided by
the judge, who in this case found, as a factual matter, that the
release was valid.169  The Supreme Court reversed.  The Court
deemed the question of the validity of the release as one of fed-
eral substantive law, and, what is important for present purposes,
that the plaintiff had a right to have that factual question decided
by the jury:
“The right to trial by jury is ‘a basic and fundamental feature
of our system of federal jurisprudence’” and . . . is “part and
parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the
[FELA].” . . . It follows that the right to trial by jury is too
substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to permit it
to be classified as a mere “local rule of procedure” for denial
in the manner that Ohio has here used.170
deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty.”), with  Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,
Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (“Arbitration is a form of proce-
dure whereby differences may be settled.  It is not a definition of the rights and
wrongs out of which differences grow.”)  Both Red Cross Line  and Berkovitz  were
construing the New York Arbitration Law of 1920.
167 342 U.S. 359 (1952). See, e.g. , Bellia, supra  note 13, at 984; Parmet, supra  note
13, at 17; Stewart, supra  note 13, at 432-33; William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System , 16 STAN L. REV. 1 (1963).
168 Dice , 342 U.S. at 360; see  Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(2000).  The FELA, a turn-of-the-century statute governing tort claims by railroad
workers, was designed to override various anti-plaintiff tort doctrines. See
Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 25, 28 n.103.  It guaran-
teed ultimate choice of forum—federal or state—to the plaintiff by barring removal
of cases filed in state court.  The FELA is thus unique in modern legislation, and
arguably makes greater demands on state court dockets than any other federal stat-
ute.  A number of questions naturally arose as to the relationship between FELA’s
substantive provisions and state court procedures.
169 Dice , 342 U.S. at 360-62.
170 Id . at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. R.R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943)).
Most scholars understand Dice  to create a rule that a federal procedure applies in
state court where it is “part and parcel” of the federal right at issue, see  Bellia, supra
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Similarly, questions that define the nature of the federal right,
such as the form of action (legal or equitable),171 the placement
of the burden of proof (which distinguishes whether the right is a
claim or defense),172 and the elements required to plead it suffi-
ciently, may be matters of federal law.173
note 13, at 960-61; Parmet, supra  note 13, at 18; Stewart, supra  note 13, at 433-34,
but its holding may be even narrower than that.  Significantly, Dice  distinguishes,
but does not overrule, Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis , 241 U.S. 211,
219 (1916), which held that Minnesota’s provision for non-unanimous jury verdicts
was validly applied to an FELA case in the Minnesota courts, notwithstanding the
long-established requirement of unanimous jury verdicts for federal trials. Bombo-
lis , which stands for the proposition that federal statutory rights do not carry federal
jury practices in tow, could be reconciled with Dice  by distilling the rule that FELA
questions must be decided by the jury according to whatever jury practice  the state
court provides.  But the Dice  opinion says even less than this:  it appears to leave
open the possibility that Ohio could have had a judge decide all FELA questions
without a jury “had Ohio abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases including
those arising under the federal Act.” Dice , 342 U.S. at 363.  Instead, “[Ohio] has
provided jury trials for cases arising under the federal Act but seeks to single out
one phase of the question of fraudulent releases for determination by a judge rather
than by a jury.  Compare Testa v. Katt , 330 U.S. 386.” Id .  The citation to Testa
suggests that Dice  advances nothing more than a non-discrimination principle:  Con-
gress could not compel a state to provide a jury trial for a category of actions—such
as negligence actions—but must instead “take state courts as it finds them,” so long
as the state court does not treat the federal right differently. See id .
171 Dice  can be seen as deciding who gets to define the form of action of a federal
statutory right.  The right to jury factfinding is a right at common law, whereas
judges are the factfinders in equity. Dice  suggests that a state court may not
recharacterize a federal right “at law” as an equitable right, as the Ohio court did,
thereby taking a fact issue away from the jury. Justice Black, the author of Dice , was
known for his solicitude for the role of the jury, and was hostile in particular to
judges taking issues away from the jury by the device of deciding equitable issues in
the same case. See  Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (Black, J.) (explain-
ing that the judge cannot take fact question away from jury by characterizing the
common law jury question as “incidental” to equitable issues); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (Black, J.) (explaining that the right to jury trial of
legal issues cannot be lost through prior determination of equitable claims in the
same case).
172 See  Cent. Vt. R.R. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915) (holding that the
FELA intended to adopt the federal rule placing that burden of proof on the defen-
dant and that such a rule “is a part of the very substance of [plaintiff’s] case” and not
“a mere matter of state procedure”).
173 See  Brown v. W. R.R. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 295-96 (1949) (reversing dismissal
of FELA complaint by Georgia state court applying a strict state “pleading suffi-
ciency” rule).  While the Court in Brown  opined that “[s]trict local rules of pleading
cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized
by federal laws,” the Court stopped short of stating that a liberal federal pleading
rule should apply in state court. See id . at 298-99.  Instead, the case seems limited to
the proposition that unduly narrow construction of federal claims pleaded in state
courts will be scrutinized and reversed by the Supreme Court exercising its supervi-
sory authority over state courts on federal questions. See id . at 296 (emphasizing the
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 47 18-FEB-05 9:29
The Federal Arbitration Act 587
Finally, a handful of decisions seem to establish a rule that
state procedures which “unduly burden” or “frustrate” a federal
substantive right in state court are preempted.  In Felder v.
Casey , the Supreme Court invalidated a state law “notice of
claim” requirement that created additional procedural hurdles to
a plaintiff bringing a police brutality case in state court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.174  Viewing the question as “essentially one of pre-
emption,” the Court reasoned that the notice of claim statute
stood as an obstacle to the purposes of Congress in enacting sec-
tion 1983.175  Thus, “[f]ederal law takes state courts as it finds
them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not ‘im-
pose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by
federal courts.’”176  Significantly, these are special cases of
Testa ’s non-discrimination principle: preemption of a state proce-
dure does not result in the imposition of a federal procedural
rule by default, but rather forces the state to treat the federal
claim in the same manner as comparable state claims.
This distinction between a non-discrimination rule and a prin-
ciple that federal procedural law sometimes applies, while per-
haps subtle, is important.  The non-discrimination principle stops
Court’s “duty to construe the allegations of this complaint ourselves”); id . at 297
(“We hold that the allegations of the complaint do set forth a cause of action which
should not have been dismissed.”); id.  at 299 (“Should this Court  fail to protect
federally created rights from dismissal because of over-exacting local requirements
for meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in adjudication of federally created
rights could not be achieved.”) (emphasis added); see also  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131, 159-60 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that Brown  does not hold
that federal procedures apply in state courts). Cf.  Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 319
U.S. 350 (1943) (reversing directed verdict in Vermont state court FELA adjudica-
tion on ground that evidence was sufficient to go to jury).  In other words, the Court
may have assumed that while it could apply a federal pleading construction rule in
the Supreme Court itself—a federal court—its guidance to state courts to construe
FELA complaints broadly may have been mere exhortation.  Nevertheless, Brown
has subsequently been taken to stand for its more broadly stated proposition that a
“federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice,” and as at least
implying that a state pleading rule might be preempted in state court.  Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (quoting Brown , 338 U.S. at 296.)
174 487 U.S. 131.  The net effect of the notice-of-claim provision was both to create
an exhaustion requirement that would not apply to the same claim filed in federal
court, and to shorten the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. Id . at 136-37
(discussing WIS. STAT. § 893.801(1)(a) (1997) and similar state statutes).
175 487 U.S. at 138.
176 Id . at 150 (quoting Brown , 338 U.S. at 298-99). See also Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356 (1990) (striking down state-law qualified immunity defense applied to bar a
section 1983 action against a municipality in state court); Brown , 338 U.S. at 298-99
(holding, arguably, that restrictive state pleading rule is preempted if applied as an
undue burden on federal cause of action).
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short of requiring states to restructure neutral rules of their court
system.  The Dice /Felder /Testa  line of cases imposes a non-dis-
crimination principle requiring that federal claims be heard in a
non-discriminatory manner.  But Johnson  and the “valid excuse”
cases suggest that states do not have a duty to take affirmative
steps other than opening their courthouse doors in a non-dis-
criminatory manner.  Thus, states do not have to expand the ex-
isting jurisdiction of their courts or create new procedures—or
adopt federal procedures—to accommodate a federal claim.
Suppose, for example, a state court system abolished pre-trial
discovery, and a party claimed that this significant limitation—
which applied neutrally across the board—made it impracticable
to assert his federal claim or defense.  One solution would be to
hold that, in the extreme case where the state fails to provide
minimally adequate procedures, the federal procedure follows
the federal substantive right in tow into state court, lest the fed-
eral substantive right be undermined.  But this solution seems
much more problematic than the alternatives.  It may be suffi-
cient to allow the parties equal access to federal court through
federal question jurisdiction and removal; if they decide to re-
main in state court, they must accept the state’s neutral procedu-
ral limitations.  This is the implicit solution in Johnson .  In
extreme cases, it might be held that the state courts lack “compe-
tent” or “adequate” jurisdiction to hear the federal claims be-
cause they fail to provide the minimum procedural protections
contemplated by Congress in creating the federal right.  The
proper constitutional solution is not to change a state’s neutral
rule of judicial administration, but to make sure that a federal
forum is available to hear the claim (and require that the state
dismiss the federal claim for lack of appropriate jurisdiction).177
III
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REGULATE STATE COURT
PROCEDURES (II): STATE LAW CLAIMS
If Congress has any implied power at all over state court pro-
cedure or jurisdiction, that power would seem to be greatest
when it was being exercised in service of a federal substantive
right, which would apply in state court under the Supremacy
Clause.  In the absence of such a federal right, the claim to any
177 See  Hart, supra  note 124, at 508.
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power over state courts seems a fortiori  weaker.  Moreover, if
Congress were to have a direct and per se authority over the
structure and procedures of state courts, such authority must still
fall within one of its enumerated powers.  This section examines
whether Congress has the power to regulate state court structure
and procedure without creating federal substantive rights, in or-
der to further a national objective that arguably falls within one
of Congress’s enumerated powers.178
The question of the power of Congress to regulate state court
procedures for resolving state law claims has not been squarely
considered by the Supreme Court, although a number of recent
bills, and at least two enacted federal laws, raise that issue.
A. Sample Statutes
The idea of congressional assertions of power over state court
procedures for state law claims is not hypothetical.  A number of
attempts have been proposed and even enacted in recent years,
mostly in the areas of “tort reform” and in an effort to effect a
nationwide settlement of tobacco litigation.  These bills and en-
actments reflect attempts by Congress to regulate a substantive
area that would undoubtedly fall within the commerce power,
but to do so indirectly, using state courts and state law as the
medium—“stealth preemption,” in the words of Professor
Parmet.179  I add to these a hypothetical statute in which Con-
gress seeks to regulate, not a substantive area, but the problem of
state-court dispute resolution itself—a regulation of procedure
for the sake of regulating procedure.  The latter hypothetical is a
useful foil to analyze the FAA, since, I will argue, the FAA is
itself a procedural statute that has been construed as national
regulation of state court dispute resolution processes.
1. Actual Bills and Enactments
In recent years, a number of proposals have been introduced
in Congress, and at least one bill has been enacted, that would
178 The following argument analyzes the assertion by Congress of a coercive
power over state judicial procedure, against non-consenting states.  Use of the
spending power changes the analysis entirely.  Subject to limits beyond which a pur-
ported exercise of spending power becomes “coercive,” Congress may well be able
to use federal funds to induce state consent to nationwide reforms of state judicial
procedures. See  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
179 Parmet, supra  note 13, at 1.
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regulate state court procedures.180  “Tort reform” proposals gov-
erning specific categories of state law cases, such as products lia-
bility or securities fraud, have sought to regulate such state court
procedures as statutes of limitations and the availability of class
actions.181  Proposed federal legislation to craft a nationwide set-
tlement of tobacco litigation would have prohibited class actions
and consolidation of state court claims without a defendant’s
consent.182
The Y2K Act,183 which became law in 1999, may well have
been the most sweeping congressional effort to regulate state
procedures for state law claims.  The Act was designed to control
the impact of anticipated litigation arising from “Y2K failures.”
Prior to 2000, it was feared that most computers, programmed to
read dates by the last two digits of the year (for example, “99”
for “1999”), would “fail to process dates after December 31,
1999,” and would therefore malfunction, bringing down with
them much of the computer-based infrastructure of the United
States, and indeed the world.184  Congress was concerned that
180 See generally  Bellia, supra  note 13, at 953-56; Parmet, supra  note 13, at 3-10;
Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Federal Product Liability Reform, Warning Not
Heeded , 64 TENN. L. REV. 665, 667 (1997); Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congres-
sional Federalism:  The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort
Cases and Other Complex Litigation , 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1605-10 (2000).
181 See, e.g. , Asbestos Compensation Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1586, 108th Cong.
(2003) (limiting venue in state court asbestos cases and requiring filing of injury
report with complaint); Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong.
(1998) (imposing nationwide statute of limitations for certain state law products lia-
bility actions); Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. (1997)
(establishing procedural requirements for award of punitive damages in state law
cases); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, S. 1260, 105th Cong.
(1997) (prohibiting certain class actions in state court under state securities laws);
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. (1995) (same); Product Liability Fairness Act of 1993, S. 687, 103d Cong.
(1993) (establishing certain settlement procedures for state court cases).  The Amer-
ican Law Institute has advocated rationalizing “mass tort” cases by federal coordina-
tion of state court complex litigation. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX
LITIGATION:  STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER’S
STUDY 36 (1994) (proposing federal panel to select state court to hear consolidated
mass tort case); id.  at 192-93 (proposing nationwide service of process for state court
actions).
182 See  Parmet, supra  note 13, at 5.  Professor Laurence H. Tribe, testifying before
Congress on the global tobacco settlement, considered the constitutionality of this
aspect of the proposal. See A Review of the Global Tobacco Settlement:  Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 105th Cong. 158 (1997) (statement of Lau-
rence H. Tribe, Professor of Law).
183 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2000).
184 Id . § 6601(a)(1)(A).
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Y2K failures would produce “a significant volume of litigation,
much of it insubstantial,”185 which would “strain the Nation’s le-
gal system” and “threaten . . . the effective functioning of the
national economy.”186  Thus, to “establish uniform legal stan-
dards” and “encourage private and public parties alike to resolve
disputes . . . by alternative dispute mechanisms,”187 the Act im-
posed a number of procedural requirements for any “Y2K ac-
tion,” defined in part as “a civil action commenced in any Federal
or State court.”188  These included a requirement that plaintiffs
serve written notice before filing suit, the imposition of a
remediation period to fix the problem before a suit could be
maintained, rules governing class actions, and various heightened
pleading requirements.189  The Act also imposed damages caps
and certain rules governing substantive liability, contribution,
and apportionment of fault.190  Happily, the Y2K crisis proved to
be a non-event, and a constitutional test of the statute was not
needed.
2. The Expeditious Dispute Resolution Act
Most of the actual bills and enactments in which Congress at-
tempts to regulate state court procedure have involved statutes
that seem to mix procedural and substantive provisions, such as
the Y2K Act.  To throw the question of congressional power to
regulate state procedure into sharper relief, we should consider a
federal statute regulating procedure only, with no substantive
provisions.  To do this, we must move to the realm of the
hypothetical.
Imagine a proposed Expeditious Dispute Resolution Act of
2005.  In the interest of the expeditious resolution of disputes in-
volving contracts relating to interstate commerce, all such dis-
putes in state court shall follow certain federally mandated rules.
First, no jury trial will be permitted; all such cases must be tried
to the court.  Second, state appellate courts may only reverse trial
court judgments for “manifest disregard of the law.”  Third, de-
nial of motions for summary judgment shall be immediately ap-
pealable to the state appellate court, on an interlocutory basis,
185 Id . § 6601(a)(3)(A).
186 Id . § 6601(a)(3)(B)(ii), (iii).
187 Id . § 6601(b)(1), (3).
188 Id . § 6602(1).
189 Id . §§ 6606-07, 6614.
190 Id . §§ 6604, 6608-12.
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before the case is tried.  Fourth, there is no presumptive right to
pre-trial discovery, which will be limited to whatever discovery
the parties agree upon.  For good measure, the EDRA provides
for a nationwide jurisdictional minimum of $50,000 in order to
gain entry into a state court of general jurisdiction, and holds that
claims for any lesser amount must be submitted to limited juris-
diction courts with simplified procedures and evidentiary rules,
such as small claims courts.
An amended version of the EDRA “contractualizes” these
provisions.  Instead of imposing them directly on the states,
EDRA II provides that private parties can agree to an “EDRA
clause” in any contract involving interstate commerce.  Such
EDRA clauses will be enforced as a matter of federal law, pre-
empting any state law to the contrary.
The constitutional problems inherent in either version of
EDRA—as well as the parallels between the EDRA and the
FAA—are intended to be fairly obvious, and will be discussed
below.
B. The Commerce Clause as a Source of Congressional Power
over State Court Procedure
The most arguable basis for a general congressional power
over state court procedures independent of federal substantive
law is the commerce power.  Under this argument, Congress may
assert general authority over state court dispute resolution, par-
ticularly with respect to disputes involving interstate commerce
subject matter, because state court litigation substantially affects
interstate commerce.  None of the real or imaginary congres-
sional statutes that impose procedural rules on the states have as
their aim the modification of state court systems for its own sake:
Congress is not simply saying, “We have a better way to run a
court system.”  In each case, Congress is pursuing a policy goal
other than procedure, one that is at bottom substantive.  The To-
bacco Settlement Act is a regulation of the tobacco industry.  The
Y2K act is designed to lessen the impact of tort liability on high
tech industry.  Various tort reform proposals are designed to
lessen tort liability of classes of tort defendants.  Even EDRA is
aimed at promoting efficiency in interstate commerce by making
litigation cheaper and faster.  Any of these goals appear to fall
within the commerce power.  Why can’t Congress promote these
“substantive” goals indirectly by legislating state court proce-
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dures?  Aren’t such laws “necessary and proper” in the sense of
being “rationally related” to a legislative end that falls within the
Commerce Clause or other Article I powers?
Under the “substantial effects” test as clarified or (depending
on your point of view) modified by United States v. Morrison191
and United States v. Lopez ,192 Congress may regulate intrastate
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, if
those activities are “economic” or “commerical” in nature.193
The argument in favor of finding a commerce power to regulate
state court procedures might start with the fact that litigation in-
volves economic transactions at two levels: parties typically pay
to conduct it, and the remedies sought between the parties typi-
cally involve the redistribution of economic values, whether
money or something else.  The tort reform statutes, aimed at reg-
ulating particular substantive areas of interstate commerce such
as the tobacco industry or products liability, reveal a clear link
between the regulation and interstate commerce, since litigation
undoubtedly has a significant effect on these areas.  The com-
merce argument for EDRA, however, is that state law dispute
resolution affects interstate commerce more generally.
The argument on the other side is that state court litigation is
an intrastate activity and that, although it undoubtedly has a sub-
stantial affect on interstate commerce, it is itself not economic or
commercial.  Even if litigants are themselves pursuing economic
activity by litigating, federal regulation of state court procedures
is one step removed: not regulation of that activity, but regula-
tion of state government regulation of  that arguably commercial
activity.  Thus, by making procedural law for state courts, Con-
gress regulates not the economic aspects of litigation, but instead
regulates the state’s regulation of litigation.
The argument may be something of a close call, though one
191 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down civil enforcement provision of Violence
Against Women Act).
192 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act).
193 See Lopez , 514 U.S. at 560, 565; Morrison , 529 U.S. at 610.  The economic/
non-economic distinction was applied only insofar as Congress sought to regulate
intrastate activity having substantial interstate effects. See, e.g., Lopez , 514 U.S. at
560.  At least some state court litigation—cases involving parties or attorneys from
more than one state—is arguably an interstate activity, which could thus be regu-
lated, insofar as Lopez  and Morrison  are concerned, by requiring an interstate juris-
dictional element (traveling or communicating across state lines to litigate)
irrespective of whether litigation is “economic” activity. See Lopez , 514 U.S. at 549,
561-62.
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should not have great confidence that an activity at only one re-
move from commercial activity falls outside the commerce
power, particularly when the objective of the statute is to regu-
late commerce.194  But I find the definitional argument some-
what sterile, because the application of the Lopez-Morrison  test
fails to capture the real federalism stakes.  The question is not
whether some clear definition of commerce prevents application
of the commerce power, but rather this: if the federal system is to
mean anything, there must be certain aspects of state sovereignty
that are immune from commerce regulation even though an ar-
gument could be made that the law falls within the definition of
the modern commerce power.
Nothing about the commerce power changes the applicability
of the state sovereignty arguments.  Commerce simply means
that the legislative subject matter falls within Congress’s enumer-
ated powers.  In Johnson v. Fankell , there was no question that
section 1983 claims were within Congress’s enumerated power;
nevertheless, the Court held that Congress’s power over sub-
stance did not extend to a power over state court procedure.195
Likewise, to say that regulating procedure means regulating state
government regulation rather than regulating individuals di-
rectly, is simply to restate that the law in question—though per-
haps within the commerce power—nevertheless improperly
commandeers the state courts, and the state legislatures who
have constitutional authority to prescribe rules for them.  Legis-
lation may fall within the commerce power but fall outside the
power of Congress because it impermissibly interferes with state
autonomy, as seen in New York  and Printz .  The Necessary and
Proper Clause adds nothing to the analysis, which is the gist of
the majority’s barb in Printz  that the clause is used as “the last,
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional
action.”196
To sustain the argument that Congress lacks power to pre-
scribe procedural rules for state law claims, there is no need to
arrive at a precise “location” for the state’s core sovereignty over
its own courts or Congress’s corresponding lack of power.  As in
Printz , the state’s power is part of that “residuary and inviolable
sovereignty” that is “reflected throughout the Constitution’s
194 See  Bellia, supra  note 13, at 970.
195 520 U.S. 911, 911 (1997).
196 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
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text.”197  In addition to the provisions cited in Printz  reflecting
state sovereignty in general, the implications of Article III’s vest-
ing clause for the related question of jurisdiction lend further
support to this limit on Congress’s power.  As argued above, the
discretionary character of Congress’s power to create lower fed-
eral courts implies, at the same time, both that state courts of
competent jurisdiction will conduct federal judicial business, and
that Congress’s solution to the absence of sufficient state courts
is to create not state, but federal courts of competent jurisdiction.
By analogy, where Congress would prefer to control the details
of procedure for a federal right, its solution is not to legislate
procedures for state courts, but to make federal court jurisdiction
exclusive for that right.198
C. Congressional Power over State Procedure to Pursue
Unenacted Federal Substantive Goals? Protective Jurisdiction
and “Lesser-Included” Preemption
So how would Congress implement selective tort reforms,
when much of the subject of tort reform is probably well within
its commerce power?  Is Congress powerless to enact nationwide
procedural reforms in state courts?
The Supremacy Clause gives Congress vast potential power to
preempt state law; even within the confines of the enumerated
powers, the modern Commerce Clause allows Congress to regu-
late most things, Lopez  and Morrison  notwithstanding.  But the
Supremacy Clause and preemption of state law are limited to
substantive law.  As a corollary, preemption of state law does not
imply the imposition of federal procedural codes.  The FELA, for
example, occupies the field of tort regulation of railroad workers,
but leaves state court procedures in place (subject to the limited
exceptions discussed above).199
The Constitution’s answer is thus that Congress’s means of
controlling state courts—beyond the narrow, incidental influence
in some reverse-Erie  cases described above—is limited to the
blunt instrument of preemption combined with exclusive federal
jurisdiction.  If Congress wanted to immunize all car manufactur-
197 Id . at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
198 Cf. , Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (describing in-
stances of exclusive federal jurisdiction, which “completely pre-empt[ ]” state courts
from hearing claim).
199 See supra  text accompanying notes 162-75.
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ers from class actions, under Johnson v. Fankell  and the federal-
ism principles described above, it could not pass a law simply
barring states from entertaining class actions in state cases
against car manufacturers; it would have to occupy the field of
car manufacturer liability, grant exclusive jurisdiction of such
claims to federal courts, and bar federal class actions.200
Preemption of this sort may seem like overkill—taking over
the whole field to fix a small piece.  The argument has been ad-
vanced that Congress’s power to enact a substantive regulatory
scheme preempting state law carries the “lesser included” power
of dictating state court procedures.201  To take the hypothetical
EDRA example, if Congress could federalize all cases involving
transactions affecting interstate commerce, and deprive state
courts of jurisdiction over them entirely, why can it not take the
less “intrusive” measure of prescribing certain procedural re-
quirements to apply to state court in those cases?
There are two fundamental flaws with this argument.  To begin
with, while the purported power to regulate state procedures for
state law contracts claims may represent a lesser intrusion  on
state autonomy than complete preemption of the field, it is not a
“lesser included” power, because it is not “included .”  The fact
that Congress possesses the nuclear bomb of preemption-plus-
exclusive jurisdiction does not imply that it also possesses a small
commando team with “surgical strike” capability to take out
state court procedures only.  As seen above, the principle that
federal substantive law “takes state courts as it finds them” nec-
essarily views substantive and procedural rules as distinct, and
Congress’s power to make substantive law has never been held to
include a power over state procedure—beyond those exceptional
200 Congress could impose more modest procedural reforms through reverse-Erie
principles.  For instance, to impose a heightened burden of proof (such as clear and
convincing evidence), or a six-month statute of limitations in all product liability
cases, it would have to enact a substantive federal product liability standard that
preempted all state laws imposing liability for product defects.  Arguably, under
Dice , state courts should then apply the federal burden of proof or statute of limita-
tions as procedural incidents bound up with the federal defense.
Congress can preserve state substantive law rules in a preempted area by making
state law the rule of decision.  Two examples of this technique are the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2000), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2000).
Note, however, that these areas are federalized in the relevant sense, insofar as such
a statute creates federal jurisdiction.  Neither of these statutes purports to modify
state court procedure beyond what might be implicit in reverse-Erie  doctrine.
201 See Parmet, supra  note 13, at 24-25.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 57 18-FEB-05 9:29
The Federal Arbitration Act 597
cases in which a discriminatory state procedure is preempted, or
where federal law views the purported state procedure as “part
and parcel” of a federal substantive right.
Second, as argued above, recognized federalism principles
hold that states have a fundamental interest in control over their
own court procedures, and the implication of the Felder  line of
cases is that this interest cannot be overcome unless the state
procedural rule undermines, or (an even narrower version of the
exception) discriminates against, a substantive federal interest.
In the EDRA example, as with the actual proposed tobacco set-
tlement and “tort reforms,” Congress has not made manifest the
underlying federal interests in the form of a substantive right.
The lack of a federal commitment reflected in such a move fur-
ther counsels against ceding to Congress the power over state
procedure in this context.
As pointed out by Professors Parmet and Bellia, the “lesser
included” argument is also a close cousin to the constitutionally
dubious theory of “protective jurisdiction.”202  The concept of
“protective jurisdiction” holds that Congress can give jurisdiction
to federal courts over state law claims where Congress could, but
has not, preempted state law with substantive federal regula-
tion.203  The “protective” federal jurisdiction is a less intrusive
means of creating federal jurisdiction than is substantive regula-
tion, because it would allow states to continue to control the sub-
stantive law, while allowing federal courts to adjudicate the state
law claims in an area of unspoken federal concern.  The Supreme
Court has declined several opportunities to adopt a theory of
protective jurisdiction, suggesting that such a theory “present[s]
grave constitutional problems.”204
Finally, although it seems problematic at first blush to allow
Congress no choices between the two poles of taking state courts
as it finds them and displacing state courts from classes of adjudi-
cation entirely, on further reflection that principle has much to
recommend it, if one believes in federalism.  Whether tinkering
with, or more aggressively restructuring state court structure and
procedures, congressional control raises all the accountability
202 Id .; Bellia, supra  note 13, at 991.
203 See  Parmet, supra  note 13, at 24 & n.154.
204 See id . at 25-26 (quoting Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989)).  Again,
Congress can come close to doing this by adopting state substantive rules of decision
for federal statutory claims. See supra  note 200.
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problems identified in New York  and Printz .  It also enables
Congress to undertake controversial substantive regulation
under the double guise of procedural regulation, and state  proce-
dural regulation at that—hence Professor Parmet’s phrase,
“stealth preemption.”205  On the other hand, requiring Congress
to create preemptive substantive law coupled with exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction requires a level of substantive commitment to an
area of law commensurate with the intrusion on state autonomy.
Federal judicial and administrative resources, rather than state,
must be committed to such an undertaking.  Congress is not
likely to undertake this lightly—it has done so only rarely in fed-
eral law.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
There is some force to the argument that Congress may have
some power over state court procedure pursuant to section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to en-
force the amendment’s commands.206  If this is the case, then
Congress may have the power to enact legislation to modify or
nullify state court procedures that violate due process or equal
protection.  Moreover, Congress’s section 5 power extends to
“prophylactic” legislation aimed at state action that, while consti-
tutional in itself, is justifiably prohibited in order to prevent con-
stitutional violations.  Under City of Boerne v. Flores , however,
such “prophylactic” legislation must be “congruent” and “pro-
portional” to the constitutional violations.207  “Congruence”
seems to refer to the degree of logical “fit” between the prohibi-
tion to the violations, while “proportionality” suggests that there
must be a significant record of past constitutional violations to
support the need for the preventive measure.208  It is thus clear
205 Parmet , supra  note 13, at 1.
206 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  It is a commonplace to speak of various consti-
tutional provisions as imposing “federal” control over state courts.  For example, the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, which have been applied to the states by
means of incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, have
been recognized as imposing an elaborate “code of criminal procedure” on the
states.  The Fourteenth Amendment has frequently been applied to constrain state
judicial procedures. See, e.g. , Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).  But federal
constitutional  control over state procedures is a very different matter from congres-
sional  control, raising fewer and different federalism issues, and these should not be
confused.  Congress has rarely, if ever, used its Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment power to regulate state procedures.
207 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
208 See id .
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that congressional regulation of state procedure under the Due
Process Clause would be exceptional in nature.209
For instance, neither EDRA nor the tobacco settlement nor
tort reform statutes would pass the test for Fourteenth Amend-
ment regulation aimed at preventing state constitutional viola-
tions.  To begin with, most state legislative classifications making
distinctions among types of tort or contract claims are constitu-
tional: they would be scrutinized only under the Fourteenth
Amendment rational basis test, and would doubtless be found
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.  While
constitutional state action can be regulated as a “prophylactic”
measure, it is difficult to imagine what possible constitutional vi-
olation such a regulation would be designed to prevent.  The only
significant constitutional issue the modern Supreme Court has
found relating to “tort reform” is the question of excessive puni-
tive damages violating due process;210 but it is doubtful that the
Court would find that any state has demonstrated a “pervasive”
pattern of allowing unconstitutional awards, particularly in the
limited time frame when “excessive” awards have been deemed
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  In sum, the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause falls short of providing a gen-
eral congressional authority over state court procedures.
IV
THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED: DOES CONGRESS HAVE
THE POWER TO IMPOSE ARBITRATION
PROCEDURES ON THE STATES?
The Supreme Court, implicitly recognizing the foregoing prin-
ciples, acknowledged in Southland  that the FAA must be
deemed substantive law in order for it to bind state courts under
the Supremacy Clause.211  Conversely, if the FAA is a procedural
statute, it cannot be constitutionally applied to state courts.  The
FAA does not, in its plain terms, purport to impose procedural
regulation upon state courts, and Southland  says the FAA is sub-
stantive law.212  In this section, however, I look beneath South-
209 See  Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and  Testa:  The Infrastructure of Federal
Supremacy , 32 IND. L. REV. 111, 127-36 (1998).
210 See, e.g. , State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
211 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
212 Id .
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land ’s semantics to examine whether the FAA is indeed
procedural or substantive law.
Thus far I have taken for granted the existence of a viable dis-
tinction between “substantive” and “procedural” law.  A good-
faith effort to grapple with the elusive substance-procedure dis-
tinction is perhaps overdue, and is certainly needed to analyze
whether FAA section 2 is substantive or procedural.  Every sec-
ond-year law student knows that substance and procedure are
intertwined, because substantive rights realized in litigation are
implemented—by definition—through procedures.  For that rea-
son, in addition to the inherent porosity of categories, the distinc-
tion between substance and procedure is a notoriously moving
target.  In tones equally frustrated and pragmatic, the Supreme
Court recently observed that “the meaning of ‘substance’ and
‘procedure’ in a particular context is ‘largely determined by the
purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.’”213  How many such
contexts there are is unclear: a 1933 law review article claimed to
find eight.214  But since the answers to some important legal
questions are made to turn on this distinction, it is not sufficient
to throw up our hands and dismiss the whole enterprise as arbi-
trary, thereby empowering the Court or Congress simply to make
ad hoc definitions to suit a desired outcome.
For present purposes, the issue is whether the FAA should be
deemed substantive for preemption purposes—substantive in
terms of what the Supremacy Clause allows to be imposed on the
states.
A. The FAA as Procedure in Any Relevant Context
The contextual nature of the substance-procedure inquiry
means that the definition shifts, or that a law might be deemed
substantive for some purposes but procedural for others.215  The
213 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (quoting Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988)).
214 Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws ,
42 YALE L.J. 333, 341-43 (1933).  I suspect that a close examination of these contexts
would reveal that there are in fact fewer in which the substance-procedure line is
drawn differently.
215 A classic example is the placement of the burden of proof in a negligence case.
For purposes of retroactivity (whether a change in the law’s placement of the burden
will apply only prospectively, to future torts, or will apply retroactively, to pending
cases) the issue has been held to be procedural in some cases and substantive in
others. See id . at 345.  In contrast, for purposes of whether the FELA’s placement
of the burden binds a state court, it has been held to be effectively “substantive”—
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following contexts seem sufficiently relevant to the question of
FAA preemption to merit consideration.  From any of the fol-
lowing angles, the FAA appears to be fundamentally procedural.
1. The Classical Context
What I am calling the “classical” context for the substance-pro-
cedure distinction is really a formalist position, reflecting the idea
that a single line can be drawn distinguishing the two categories
for all purposes.  Although this idea has been deflated by the le-
gal realism movement,216 like classical microeconomics, classical
music, and classical anything, it continues to have adherents and
can often provide an informative analytical starting point.  Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna v. Plumer  supplies as clear a ver-
sion as any,217 as explained by Professor Margaret Stewart: “sub-
stantive law is that law which controls ‘the primary activity of
citizens.’  In other words, laws that tell you what promises you
must keep, what degree of care you must exercise toward others,
and what lies you may not tell, all regulate your daily conduct
and are ‘substantive.’”218  This definition implies a connection
between substantive law and grounds for liability; in the same
vein, in Felder v. Casey , the Court equated substantive law with
“rights of recovery.”219  Procedural rules, in contrast, do not “af-
fect the primary, every-day activities of individuals . . . they de-
fine procedural choices about the allocation of judicial resources.
Such choices do obviously affect the ease with which litigation
may be pursued, but that impact does not convert those choices
into ‘substantive’ law.”220
Certain questions regarding retroactive application of a stat-
ute—whether a change in the law will apply to conduct com-
pleted before the change—seem to turn on the classical
that is, sufficiently bound up with substance to apply in state court. See  Cent. Vt.
Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915).
216 The Cook article is a neat and entertaining example of a realist shredding a
formalist conceptual distinction. See  Cook, supra  note 214.  Llewellyn’s article on
canons of statutory construction is probably the gold standard for this endeavor. See
generally  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed , 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950).
217 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
218 Stewart, supra  note 13, at 432 (quoting Hanna , 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
219 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141, 150 (1988).
220 Stewart, supra  note 13, at 435.
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substance-procedure distinction.  Changes in procedural rules
“instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit” will be ap-
plied without concerns regarding retroactivity “[b]ecause rules of
procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct.”221
Likewise, new jurisdictional rules will normally be applied to
pending cases because they “speak to the power of the court
rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties” and
“take[ ] away no substantive right but simply change[ ] the tribu-
nal that is to hear the case.”222
Under the classical definition, the FAA looks much more pro-
cedural than substantive.  On one hand, the FAA seems to create
a federal right of action or “right of recovery,” together with a
remedy to enforce arbitration agreements.  Yet, the closer one
looks, the less the FAA appears substantive in this sense.  En-
forcement of an arbitration agreement is the imposition of “alter-
native dispute resolution,” which is simply the substitution of one
set of procedures for another.  An arbitration agreement “trades
the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”223
Enforcing an arbitration agreement under the FAA means
only one thing: providing a specific enforcement remedy compel-
ling arbitration.  A major purpose of the FAA was to ensure that
the specific performance remedy would be available; some courts
had previously allowed a damages remedy, but the drafters of the
FAA deemed this insufficient. A specific performance remedy is
procedural in classical terms.224
Moreover, the rule of enforcement is aimed, not at primary
behavior, but at disputing behavior—litigation behavior.  The
right does not even come into existence in the absence of the
assertion of real primary rights under some other, truly substan-
tive law. Once the court enforces the arbitration agreement, the
consequences are entirely procedural.  The standard package of
litigation procedures—including discovery, motion practice, trial
(perhaps by jury, and always with a set of evidence rules), appeal
of right with de novo review of questions of law, and more lim-
ited, but significant, fact review—are out the window.  Unless
221 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994).
222 Id . at 274 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
223 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
224 See supra  note 166.
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provided for by contract, arbitration imposes a set of default pro-
cedures in which there is no discovery or motion practice, the
rules of evidence are dispensed with, there is of course no jury,
and judicial review is far more limited than an appellate review
of a lower court.225  The operation of the FAA to enforce a con-
tractual arbitration agreement at most triggers the imposition of
a procedural regime, substituting arbitral for court procedures.
When the enforcement right is granted by an order compelling
arbitration, the substantive merits of the dispute only then begin
to be heard.
Although the FAA provides for enforcement of contract terms
agreeing to arbitrate disputes, an arbitration agreement is a con-
tract about procedure.  It does not establish any primary rights or
duties, or create a right of recovery, but rather establishes the
rules to be followed in the event of a dispute.  In retroactivity
terms, whether or not an arbitration agreement is enforced is not
substantive, because it “simply changes the tribunal that is to
hear the case.”226  As Justice Scalia argued, overruling Southland
and dispensing with FAA preemption would not disturb the kind
of reliance interests considered in retroactivity cases: “Primary
behavior is not affected: No rule of conduct is retroactively
changed, but only (perhaps) the forum in which violation is to be
determined and remedied.”227
225 For a detailed overview of arbitration procedures, see Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print , supra  note 20, at 40-53.
226 Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 274.
227 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).  The fact that the FAA creates no federal question jurisdiction casts
further doubt on the argument that the FAA creates a substantive cause of action.
Federal rights of recovery invariably create subject matter jurisdiction in federal
court under Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The FAA provides for enforcement of
section 2 only in federal courts, either where a suit is already pending (section 3), or
by petition to a federal district court “which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction” (section 4).  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000). See supra
note 55 (explaining that “courts of the United States” refers to federal courts).
These provisions have always been understood as conferring no independent federal
question jurisdiction. See supra  text accompanying note 57.  Even where a right is
undisputedly substantive, it is far from clear whether Congress has the constitutional
power to create a federal cause of action and grant exclusive original jurisdiction to
state courts or to create a federal claim but provide that it is to be treated as state
law for jurisdictional purposes.  The latter is the status the Supreme Court has attrib-
uted to the FAA.
To be sure, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal defense, while “sub-
stantive,” nevertheless does not create federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Bene-
ficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).  But an analogy between the
FAA and a federal defense is imperfect.  The FAA is not supposed to defeat liabil-
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2. The Predispute Waiver Context
Courts have used the substance-procedure distinction for pur-
poses of applying the common law policy against prospective
waivers of substantive rights, a species of the general notion of
contract discussed above that contracts against public policy are
void.  It might be said that for purposes of applying this an-
tiwaiver rule, the primary remedial enforcement mechanisms—
damages, injunctions, and restitution—will almost always be
deemed substantive.228  They are bound up with the right, insofar
as enforcement of the right would be vitiated without them.
Thus, a number of cases hold that allowing advance contractual
waivers of remedies to be imposed by regulated drafting parties
would “‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute.” 229
Certain procedures are deemed substantive for this purpose—
sometimes called “substantial,” perhaps in the hope of avoiding
the linguistic conundrum of “substantive procedure”—if they
supply a crucial element of the remedy.230  Class actions are a
leading example.231  But any procedure could fall into this cate-
gory, if fairness were clearly placed on the line.  For instance, an
adhesion contract that seized key procedural advantages for the
drafting party might be deemed “substantively” unconsciona-
ble.232  Procedures equated with fundamental or constitutional
rights are also sometimes called “substantial” and are protected
by the policy against prospective waivers—the right to jury trial
ity, but switch to an alternate forum.  A federal defense applied in state court should
lead to a judgment for the defendant, in contrast to the affirmative remedy—staying
litigation and compelling arbitration—mandated under the FAA.
228 See, e.g. , Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63
(1995) (noting in the pre-dispute waiver context that the right to punitive damages is
“an important substantive right”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (“[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to
pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in
condemning the agreement as against public policy.”); Schwartz, Remedy-Stripping
Clauses , supra  note 30, at 53-56.
229 Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc. 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (quoting
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945)).
230 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (explaining that the right to select
judicial forum is “substantial”), overruled by  Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
231 See supra  note 100 and accompanying text.
232 See, e.g. , Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689
(Cal. 2000).
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has sometimes been so regarded.233
The Supreme Court has emphatically held arbitration under
the FAA to be procedural for predispute waiver purposes, re-
versing its former position.  The FAA enforces predispute arbi-
tration agreements, as well as so-called “submission agreements”
to send an existing dispute to arbitration.  The former are far
more problematic, since they appear in adhesion contract situa-
tions where the non-drafting party—typically, a consumer or em-
ployee—has no ability or opportunity to bargain over the terms,
and has relatively poor information about its meaning and
value.234  In the 1953 case Wilko v. Swan , the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected a claim by a defendant brokerage firm to enforce
a predispute arbitration agreement against a customer for a se-
curities fraud claim.235  Construing the antiwaiver provision in
section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibited any
contract term “purporting to . . . waive compliance with any pro-
vision of this law,”236 the Court held that the right to enforce the
Securities Act provisions in court was a “substantial” right that
could not be validly waived in advance, pursuant to an adhesion
contract. Wilko  reasoned that arbitration was an inferior forum
that would be significantly less likely to give the plaintiff a fair
shake.237  The right to judicial and jury trial, as opposed to arbi-
tration, was in effect deemed a substantial right for waiver
purposes.
However, in 1989, the Court overruled Wilko , holding in Rod-
riguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.  that the
right to a judicial forum for Securities Act claims, which is
waived by a predispute arbitration agreement, is not substan-
tive.238  The antiwaiver language in the Securities Act should
233 See  Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952)
(explaining that the right to jury trial is “substantial”).
234 All significant criticism of the FAA and arbitration agreements in courts and
the academy pertains to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See, e.g. , Schwartz, En-
forcing Small Print , supra  note 20, at 37; Sternlight, supra  note 85, at 637-38 & n.2;
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration , 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 728-29 (1999) (risk that arbitration waives sub-
stantive law rights applies only to pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
235 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
236 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000).
237 This may have been somewhat justified, since securities arbitration was estab-
lished to resolve disputes among securities industry insiders.  Because most arbitra-
tors were employed within the securities industry, there was some reason for
concern about bias.
238 490 U.S. 477, 481, 485 (1989).
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have been “read to relate to substantive provisions of the Act”
rather than  arbitration.239  The Rodriguez  Court specifically re-
jected Wilko ’s determination that arbitration affected substan-
tive rights, calling the selection of an arbitral versus a judicial
forum merely “procedural.”240  The Court asserted that arbitra-
tion agreements are “in effect, a specialized kind of forum selec-
tion clause”241 and that a party compelled to arbitrate “does not
forgo . . . substantive rights,” but “only submits to their resolu-
tion in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.242  At the same
time, the Rodriguez  Court rejected the idea that arbitration af-
fects “substantial” rights because, according to the Court, arbi-
tration provides a fair forum in no way inferior to litigation.243
That is now the official line of the courts under the FAA.  For
purposes of prospective waiver, arbitration is procedural, and is
neither “substantive,” “substantial,” nor a procedure that sub-
stantially affects substantive rights.  True enough, I have argued,
and still believe, that arbitration probably tends to favor corpo-
rate defendants—otherwise, they would not be imposing arbitra-
tion agreements in their form contracts, and there would be little
reason for the substantial controversy over the matter in the
courts and the academy.244  But the Supreme Court’s marching
orders are to assume there is no such advantage.  More to the
point, Wilko ’s (and my) argument that the right to judicial and
jury trial should be protected against prospective waiver does not
imply the opposite, that the right to arbitrate is equally funda-
mental.  The policy against waivers of substantive rights does not
recognize a non-waivable right to impose equally fair alternative
procedures, let alone unfair ones, in the form of arbitration or
otherwise.
239 Id . at 480 (internal quotations omitted).
240 Id . at 482.
241 Id . at 482-83 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974);
accord  EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 (2002) (explaining that an
arbitration agreement is “effectively a forum selection clause”).
242 E.g. , Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (explaining
that “by agreeing to arbitrate . . . a party does not forego . . . substantive rights”);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (same); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985) (same).
243 Thus, Wilko ’s “general suspicion of the desireability of arbitration and the
competance of arbitral tribunals,” Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 231 (1987), was deemed “far out of step with our current strong endorse-
ment” of arbitration under the FAA. Rodriguez de Quijas , 490 U.S. at 480.
244 See  Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print , supra  note 20, at 39, 53-66, 125.
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3. The Erie Context
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins ,245 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into
effect the same year.  “To oversimplify the transformation:
Before 1938 the federal courts in diversity cases applied federal
substantive law through state procedure (except in equity cases);
after 1938 they applied state substantive law through federal pro-
cedure.”246  This transformation of the federal court system has
created the need to distinguish procedure and substance for pur-
poses of the Erie  doctrine.  As construed by Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York v. York247 and subsequent cases, a federal diversity
court has to apply state law on questions that “‘substantially af-
fect the enforcement of the right as given by the State,’” lest “the
outcome of litigation . . . depend on the courthouse where [the]
suit [was] brought.”248  Thus “outcome-determinativeness” has
become the litmus test for the Erie  substance-procedure distinc-
tion: generally speaking, a prima facie procedural law will be
deemed “substantive” for Erie  purposes if it is outcome
determinative.
Statutes of limitations present an archetypal Erie  problem.  A
statute of limitations is procedural in the classical sense, defined
as a matter of “remedy” rather than of “right,” since it creates no
primary obligations.249  Yet statutes of limitations are notoriously
“outcome determinative”—they can extinguish liability—and
have been treated as substantive for Erie  purposes.250  Thus,
where federal statutes are silent about the limitations period,
courts—federal and state alike—generally apply the limitations
period provided under forum state law for similar causes of
action.251
The Erie  analysis tracks the predispute waiver analysis very
closely: a procedure that skews the outcome enough to be
deemed substantively important will also be “outcome determi-
245 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
246 FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 2.35,
at 119 (3d ed. 1985).
247 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
248 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (citing Guar-
anty Trust Co. of N.Y. , 326 U.S. at 108-09.)
249 See  Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988).
250 See id.  at 726; Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. , 326 U.S. at 108.
251 See, e.g. , Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
146 (1987).
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native.”  Thus, the same reasoning that led the Wilko  Court to
conclude that the court-or-arbitration choice was substantive for
waiver purposes led the Court three years later, in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America , to conclude that the law governing
enforcement of arbitration agreements was outcome determina-
tive, and therefore “substantive” for Erie  purposes.252  Tracking
a nearly identical passage in Wilko , the Bernhardt  opinion rea-
soned that arbitration was substantive in its implications because
it was an inferior form of dispute resolution for important sub-
stantive rights claims, and could therefore have a substantive ef-
fect on the outcome of litigation.253  Accordingly, the Erie
doctrine required that state law govern enforceability of the arbi-
tration agreement in a federal diversity case.254
Although the Court has had no occasion to revisit Bernhardt ’s
determination that arbitration is “outcome determinative,” the
holding and rationale of Rodriguez  effectively overrule Bern-
hardt  as well.  Under current law, arbitration would probably be
found to be “procedural”—non-outcome determinative—for
Erie  purposes. Erie  analysis is supposed to be guided by the
“twin aims” of discouraging forum shopping and avoiding unfair-
ness in the administration of justice.  If, as the Supreme Court
now assures us, arbitration provides a fair forum with no impact
252 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956).
253
[T]he remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substan-
tially affects the cause of action created by the State . . . .  Arbitrators do
not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give
their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as com-
plete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited
than judicial review of a trial—all as discussed in Wilko v. Swan[.]
Bernhardt , 350 U.S. at 203 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 376 U.S. 427, 435-38 (1953)).
254 Bernhardt , 350 U.S. at 204-05.  The Court held that the FAA did not apply to
the particular dispute because the contract in question was deemed not to involve
interstate commerce, as required to trigger the FAA. Id . at 200-01.  The question of
whether the FAA could constitutionally govern a diversity case in federal court
where the contract did  involve interstate commerce remained open for another dec-
ade.  In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co ., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), the
Court decided that the FAA governed such cases.  Notwithstanding Erie , Congress
could prescribe rules for federal courts in diversity cases even on outcome-determi-
native procedural matters, so long as the rule was within one of Congress’s enumer-
ated powers. Id . at 404-05 (“Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to
conduct themselves  with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has
power to legislate.”) (emphasis added).  For a discussion of how this aspect of Bern-
hardt  and Prima Paint  contributed to Southland ’s erroneous determination that the
FAA is substantive law, see Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7,
at 34-36.
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on substantive rights, the FAA is not outcome determinative in
any sense.  It should not affect the substantive result of the case,
nor create the sort of predictable advantage to one side that
would encourage forum shopping.255  Hence, there is no Erie -
based reason to characterize the FAA’s arbitration-enforcement
right as substantive law.
4. The Reverse-Erie Context
The “reverse-Erie” question—when will a matter of procedure
or remedy be sufficiently substantive that it will follow federal
substantive law into state court—provides yet another context
for the substance-procedure distinction.  The reverse-Erie  cases
typically start with a rule of state law that is presumptively proce-
dural in the classical sense, and then determine whether the sub-
stantive federal interest at stake in the case requires that the
procedural rule be essentially absorbed into the federal substan-
tive rule.  Again, statutes of limitations are classically a matter of
“procedure” or “remedy” and therefore presumptively a matter
of forum law.  But it is generally accepted that a particular limita-
tions period attached by federal statute to a federal right of ac-
tion must be applied in state court.  The rationale for this is a
reverse-Erie  notion that the statute of limitations is inextricably
bound with the substantive federal right.  The key point is that
procedures or remedies carried into state court by federal sub-
stantive law are treated as part of that substantive law for
Supremacy Clause purposes.
I have already suggested that from a classical starting point,
the FAA is procedural.  A reverse-Erie  case would then ask
whether arbitration is so intimately bound up with, or necessary
to the enforcement of, a federal substantive right to impose it on
state courts.  This reverse-Erie  analysis is necessarily a hypotheti-
cal thought experiment since there is no substantive right in the
FAA apart from arbitration.  One must envision a federal sub-
stantive law which adds a provision creating a predispute right to
insist on arbitration.  Suppose, for example, that the Securities
Act of 1933 had a provision stating, in FAA section 2 terms, that
as to securities claims, an arbitration agreement is valid save
upon grounds as exist at law or equity, etc.  Would arbitration be
enforced in state court?  As a matter of reverse-Erie  doctrine (as
opposed to the Southland regime), plainly not.  Under Rodri-
255 See  Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 28-29.
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guez , the Court’s view of arbitration as a substantively fair proce-
dure with no substantive implications, and its rejection of Wilko ’s
holding that the right to proceed in court rather than arbitration
was a “substantial” right, mean that arbitration would not be
“part and parcel” of any federal substantive right in the reverse-
Erie  sense.
5. The Conflict-of-Laws Context
Under conflict-of-laws principles, a state may have to, in some
cases, apply the substantive law of another state to a dispute in
its courts.  Choice-of-law rules generated through a state’s own
law, through judicial interpretation of the mandate of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, or conceivably through an act of Con-
gress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, might require a
state court to apply another state’s substantive law.256  However,
states may always apply their own procedural law, and are not
required to apply another state’s procedural law, even when ap-
plying that state’s substantive law to a claim.257  Thus, in Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman , the Supreme Court held that a state could apply
its own statute of limitations to a cause of action governed by the
substantive law of a sister state.258  The statute of limitations was
procedural for choice-of-law purposes, and therefore a matter of
state sovereignty, “‘one which belongs to the discretion of every
government, consulting its own interest and convenience.’”259
256 See, e.g. , Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722-27 (1987); see also id . at
729 (suggesting that Congress may determine choice of law rules by statute); Lay-
cock, supra  note 125 (arguing the same).
257 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971).
258 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988).
259 Id . at 726 (quoting KENT, supra  note 120, at 462-63.  The Sun Oil  decision
holds more broadly that a state is always free to apply its own law—substantive or
procedural—rather than that of another state, so long as the law is within the “legis-
lative competence” of the forum state.  Clearly, “legislative competence” is an as-
pect of “sovereignty,” see  Bellia, supra note 13, at 978, and one application of this
broad rule is that a state is never required to apply another state’s procedures, since
procedure is within the legislative competence of every state.
Professor Bellia argues that the substance-procedure distinction arising from gen-
eral conflict-of-laws principles predating the Constitution governs the distinction for
Supremacy Clause purposes.  Thus, since traditional conflicts principles have always
been understood to protect the sovereignty of a forum state over “procedure,” the
Supremacy Clause maintains that guarantee.  Professor Bellia’s argument is persua-
sive on two key points.  First, conflict-of-laws principles distinguish procedure and
allocate control of it to the forum state out a concern for sovereignty.  Second,
Testa ’s rejection of the specific conflict-of-laws rule against enforcement of foreign
penal law—which is, after all, a rule that states may decline to entertain substantive
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This issue arose in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hut-
ton ,260 discussed above.  The Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether a choice-of-law clause adopting “the laws of the
state of New York” was intended to incorporate a state law rule
barring arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.  The Court
held the agreement to be ambiguous on this point, in large part
because choice-of-law provisions are naturally read to include
only substantive law: “In other words, the provision might in-
clude only New York’s substantive rights and obligations, and not
the State’s allocation of power between alternative tribunals.”261
By placing the question of the state’s “allocation of power be-
tween [courts and arbitrators]” on the other side of the line from
“substantive rights and obligations,” Mastrobuono  strongly indi-
cates that arbitration is not substantive law for conflict-of-laws
purposes.262
6. The Supremacy/Preemption Context
As we have seen, the Supremacy Clause requires states to ap-
ply federal substantive law and entertain federal “rights of recov-
ery.”  But principles of state autonomy—captured in the notion
that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them, the anti-
commandeering principle, and the absence of sources of congres-
sional authority over state procedure—imply that state courts
will apply their own procedures and that, with limited exceptions,
Congress cannot dictate procedural rules to the states.  Thus, the
substance-procedure distinction exists in the Supremacy Clause
context as well.
Southland  holds that the FAA is substantive for Supremacy
Clause purposes, but it does so without undertaking any analysis
federal law—overrides the traditional conflicts paradigm only as to substantive fed-
eral law applicable to states; the conflicts paradigm otherwise remains intact, giving
states a residual sovereignty over procedure.
However, while the conflicts context is highly relevant, I believe that federal
supremacy and preemption are their own, separate context.  The conflicts context
deals with the states’ sovereignty vis-à-vis one another, while the supremacy context
concerns the states’ sovereignty vis-à-vis the federal government.
260 514 U.S. 52 (1995). See supra  text accompanying notes 17, 31-36.
261 514 U.S. at 60.
262 This of course contradicts other statements in Mastrobuono  to the effect that
such an allocation of power by a state would be preempted by the FAA if a state
barred punitive damage awards by arbitrators while the parties contracted other-
wise. Id . at 58.  The contradiction is just another anomaly following from the
Court’s continuing adherence to the erroneous Southland  decision.
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of “the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”263  The pur-
poses of the substance-procedure distinction in the supremacy-
preemption context is to balance the federalism interest between
Congress’s power to govern the people of the several states
under its enumerated powers and the states’ interest in maintain-
ing sovereignty over their courts.  Analysis of the substance-pro-
cedure distinction for purposes of the Supremacy Clause should
consider whether the federal statute restructures or modifies
neutral rules of state judicial administration without the presence
of a substantive impact on primary rights.  With the exception of
the Erie  context, in which a “substantive” characterization limits
rather than expands federal power, the other four contexts sug-
gest factors that should be considered.264
Significantly, the FAA emerges as procedural in each of these
contexts.  The classical, predispute waiver and reverse-Erie  con-
texts point to the absence of a federal right of recovery or sub-
stantial federal interest held by any litigant.  The conflict-of-laws
context emphasizes that the FAA’s arbitration-enforcement right
is fundamentally an “allocation of power between alternative
tribunals.”  Looking at the state sovereignty stakes, the effect of
the FAA as a procedural restructuring of state courts is readily
apparent.  As described above, with FAA preemption, state law
cases between non-diverse parties—cases that would be decided
entirely within the state court system—must be reallocated to the
alternative dispute resolution forum, notwithstanding any con-
trary state policy.  One set of procedures—arbitration proce-
dures—are thereby substituted for state-mandated procedures.
Although most states have arbitration enforcement statutes,
many of these create exceptions allowing certain categories of
cases to remain in court.  Although these questions remain open,
the argument has been entertained that other procedural attrib-
utes of the FAA, aside from the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement as such, would apply in state court.265  Thus, the FAA
263 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 1667, 1672 (2003) (quoting Sun Oil , 486
U.S. at 726).
264 Under the Erie  doctrine, a determination that the state rule is substantive tells
us that a federal court must apply it, thereby limiting the scope of otherwise applica-
ble federal law. Erie  determinations do not bind state courts to apply federal law.
See  Bellia, supra note 13, at 978 (arguing that the substance-procedure distinction
under the Erie  doctrine is “inapposite to the question whether Congress has the
power to regulate state court procedures in state law cases”).
265 See, e.g. , Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 477-79 (1989).  These include:  the issuance of a stay of litigation, Fed-
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should be viewed as procedural for Supremacy Clause purposes
because its primary effect, applied to the states, is to restructure
their judicial systems by reallocating disputes among alternative
forums within the state dispute resolution system.
Two objections could be raised to the argument that arbitra-
tion is part of the state’s dispute resolution system.  First, it can
be argued, consistent with broad and overheated dicta from some
Supreme Court decisions, that the FAA federalizes all arbitration
law.266  Therefore, arbitration is not part of the state adjudication
system, but part of a federal adjudication system.  Where the
FAA applies, this argument suggests, arbitration is an adjunct
federal forum with exclusive jurisdiction.  The FAA’s intrusion
on state sovereignty is essentially the same as that of the National
Labor Relations Board, a non-judicial federal instrumentality
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over certain labor law
matters, displacing state courts.267
But this argument—FAA arbitration as a federal adjunct—
fails.  The Constitution does not grant Congress freestanding
power over dispute resolution; that power, instead, comes from
Congress’s power under Article III and the Necessary and
Proper Clause to establish courts and procedures for cases to
which the federal judicial power extends.  These, of course, are
cases involving either diversity jurisdiction or substantive federal
regulation.  To suggest that Congress can federalize dispute reso-
lution of all potentially arbitrable state law matters is in essence
to extend the judicial power of the United States beyond the
bounds of Article III, a course whose unconstitutionality was
made clear in Marbury v. Madison .268  Thus, when the Supreme
eral Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000); a separate cause of action to petition for an
order compelling arbitration, id . § 4; a petition or motion to confirm the arbitration
award as a judgment, id . § 9; limitations on grounds for appellate review, id . § 10;
and provision for interlocutory review of an order denying arbitration, id . § 16.  An
additional question concerns whether the FAA would deprive a state of the author-
ity ever to stay arbitration in favor of litigation. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. , 489 U.S. at
477-79.
266 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983).
See supra  note 53.
267 See  San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1959)
(holding that National Labor Relations Board has preemptive primary jurisdiction
over federal labor matters); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
268 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  Nor can Congress get around this Article III
stricture by purporting to federalize all arbitrable state cases under an administrative
law rubric.  Administrative adjudication derives its mandate from substantive law.
There is no Department of Dispute Resolution outside the judicial branch, and it is
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Court (correctly) noted that the FAA creates no federal question
jurisdiction, it was not speaking about a mere formality that
could be corrected by a simple amendment or judicial construc-
tion adding federal jurisdiction.  Only if the right to enforce arbi-
tration agreements is substantive could the FAA support federal
jurisdiction, unless Congress were to regulate some substantive
aspect of all interstate contracts.  Thus, while arbitration may be
a federal adjunct in those cases where arbitration is compelled by
a federal court, FAA preemption means that state courts must
compel arbitration, even where no federal jurisdiction is present.
This fact undermines the “exclusive jurisdiction” aspect of the
“arbitration as federal adjunct” objection.  A law cannot deprive
state courts of jurisdiction while at the same time expecting state
courts to apply it as a rule of decision.269
The second objection is that arbitration is not part of the
state’s public dispute resolution system, because it is “private.”
The FAA does not restructure state courts, it could be argued,
but rather bars a class of cases from state court and sends them
into a third world of adjudication, one that is independent of
both the state and federal systems.270  But this objection does not
work either.  To begin with, the public/private distinction is itself
a subject of sovereign determination.  No one needs the state to
say that people may privately order their affairs in the absence of
rights of action.271  By definition, the creation of a right of action
means opening the door of a state’s dispute resolution system.
Moreover, most of the “law” of arbitration—and certainly the
doctrine of FAA preemption—arises only in the context of dis-
puted arbitration agreements.  Where parties engage in truly pri-
vate ordering to resolve their dispute by arbitration, they can
reach a private agreement to arbitrate (predispute or not), ad-
highly doubtful, under the doctrines of enumerated powers and separation of pow-
ers, that there could be.
269 Where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, a state court must simply dis-
miss the case—the state court’s involvement ends.  With arbitration, under the FAA
and state analogues, a court normally stays the litigation but retains jurisdiction as
the parties arbitrate.  Often the winner in arbitration will return to court to ask for
the award to be confirmed as a judgment; sometimes the loser will seek to have the
award set aside on one of the limited grounds for judicial review.
270 See  Ware, supra  note 234, at 727 (“An arbitration clause is, as the Supreme
Court recognizes, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.  It is special in that it
chooses a private, not government, forum.”).
271 The phrase “private right of action” refers to a different context, and means a
right held by a non-governmental entity to proceed in the state’s dispute resolution
system.
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here to that agreement without contesting it in court, and submit
voluntarily to the arbitrator’s decision.  But the FAA and state
arbitration statutes make that process part of the public dispute
resolution system for any dispute where one of the parties devi-
ates from that purely private model—typically, by resisting arbi-
tration or asking a court to compel it; by seeking judicial review
of a disputed procedural matter or of the arbitrator’s award; or
by seeking to confirm the arbitration award as a judgment of the
court.  Invoking any aspect of an arbitration statute crosses a sig-
nificant line from pure private ordering into a zone of public dis-
pute resolution.272  Even where the parties submit to a
predispute arbitration agreement without litigating any enforce-
ment issues, the background law of enforcement and the pros-
pect of state coercion make that agreement part of the state
system.  Only if an arbitration is purely voluntary at every
stage—regardless of background state arbitration law—could it
be seriously contended that arbitration was not part of the state
dispute resolution system.  Of course, those are not preemption
cases.
B. Arguments for the FAA as Substantive Law
Notwithstanding these reasons to view arbitration, and the
FAA, as fundamentally procedural, two arguments can be made
for finding this facially procedural issue a matter of substantive
law.  First, FAA section 2 is a rule of construction of a particular
type of contract—an arbitration agreement—and can therefore
be seen as substantive contract law.  Second, it could be argued
that Congress said (or, rather, intended) that FAA section 2 is
substantive law.  Our law’s elusive and malleable distinction be-
tween “substance” and “procedure” recognizes that some proce-
dural rights are of sufficient importance that they become
“substantive” for certain purposes.  Section 2 arguably creates a
procedural right that may be defined as substance for preemp-
tion purposes even though it is concededly not substantive for
other purposes.
1. Contractual Alchemy: Are Contracts Regarding Procedure
“Substantive”?
There is at least superficial appeal to the suggestion that the
272 See  Reuben, supra  note 8, at 956, 998, 1044-45, 1048-49.
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law of contracts is always a matter of substantive law.  Contract
law, in this sense, consists of the rules of formation and validity,
as well as contract defenses. Therefore, the FAA’s rule that arbi-
tration agreements are enforceable appears to be a federal rule
of contract interpretation, and necessarily substantive.
But that argument remains troublesome, and one need not dig
far beneath the surface to encounter serious problems.  To begin
with, the contract remains one regarding procedure.  FAA sec-
tion 2 says nothing about rights giving rise to the substantive dis-
pute that will be arbitrated or litigated; arbitration agreements
simply determine whether a substantive, underlying dispute—the
merits—will be decided by “the procedures and opportunity for
review of the courtroom” or “the simplicity, informality, and ex-
pedition of arbitration.”
Do procedural matters become substantive when made the
subject of a contract?  There is little reason to think so.  Parties
may agree—the relevant professional jargon is “stipulate”—to
all sorts of procedural matters, which do not thereby become en-
forceable private rights subject to “substantive” contract regula-
tion.  While judges may honor and enforce such stipulations as a
matter of convenience or judicial policy, enforceability is as-
sumed to be a matter of judges’ discretion or at most a question
of forum law—but either way, a question of procedure.  Whether
a state court action dismissed by stipulation can be reinstated is a
question of state procedural law, for instance.  The parties might
stipulate to refrain from filing summary judgment motions, yet a
court could undoubtedly override that stipulation by considering
summary judgment sua sponte  and ordering briefing.  The parties
might stipulate to a mutually convenient briefing schedule, but
there can be no doubt that a court could overrule such stipula-
tions, and it is silly to believe that formalizing such stipulations
into written “private contracts” would change their enforceability
one iota.
It is hard to believe that Congress could constitutionally pass a
law requiring state courts to honor either stipulations or “written
contracts” of litigants to alter such state judicial procedures.  I
have suggested that the proper metric for determining the mean-
ing of “substantive” law for preemption purposes is whether the
impact falls primarily on state judicial procedure.  The holding in
Johnson v. Fankell  suggests that Congress lacks the authority to
require a state court to entertain an interlocutory appeal from a
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denial of summary judgment under a federal defense, even if it
believes that a federal interest would be furthered.  Congress
should not be able to acquire that power by delegating it to indi-
viduals through the mechanism of “private contract.”  The effect
on state sovereignty—the commandeering—is not lessened sim-
ply because it has been in some trivial sense privatized.  Thus, the
take-title provision in New York  would not have become more
constitutional if the statute had authorized a private owner of
waste to go to the county recorder’s office and transfer title to
the state.  The background-check provision in the Brady Act
would not have become constitutional if it had been written in
the form of an authorization to gun dealers to add a provision to
their sales agreements requiring the local chief law enforcement
officer to conduct the background check.
The analogous category of forum selection clauses is instruc-
tive.  The Supreme Court has called arbitration agreements “in
effect, a specialized kind of forum selection clause.”273  A “forum
selection” or “venue” clause is also a contract about a procedural
matter—which court shall hear the dispute.  Like an arbitration
agreement, a forum selection clause may divest a state court of
jurisdiction over a case, while requiring no more of an affirma-
tive obligation than a dismissal or transfer order.  In Stewart Or-
ganization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp .,274 the Court, by an eight to one
margin, held that the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
controlled the determination of proper venue in a federal diver-
sity case, notwithstanding the dictates of a forum selection clause
or the forum state’s law construing such a clause.  Had the pres-
ence of a contract term rendered forum selection a “substantive”
law question, there may have been an Erie  problem in applying
federal law in a diversity case, but the court brushed this concern
aside.  “Section 1404(a) is doubtless capable of classification as a
procedural rule . . . [and] [t]herefore falls comfortably within
Congress’ powers under Article III.”275  The forum selection
273 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83
(1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)); accord
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 (2002) (explaining that the arbitra-
tion agreement is “effectively a forum selection clause”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate . . . a party does not
forgo . . . substantive rights.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
26 (1991) (same); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (same).
274 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
275 Id . at 32.
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clause, and the forum state policy disfavoring such clauses, were
merely “factors” to be balanced against procedural fairness con-
cerns under § 1404(a).276  Thus, Ricoh  implicitly recognizes that
a contract about procedure remains a matter of procedure.
If a right to have an arbitration agreement enforced is a sub-
stantive “primary right,” the reason cannot be its mere presence
in a contract, because the FAA’s requirement of a written con-
tract is a formality from the vantage point of rights.  Such a right
should theoretically be cognizable without a contract.  Suppose
the FAA had been written in the following way:
Any dispute arising out of a transaction affecting interstate
commerce shall be submitted to private, binding arbitration
pursuant to such rules as determined by the parties to the dis-
pute or by the arbitrator of such dispute; and no such dispute
may proceed in court in place of arbitration without the con-
sent of all parties.
This statute accomplishes the same thing as the FAA minus
only the requirement of a contract.  It is limited to transactions
affecting commerce, and requires the consent of both parties to
litigate rather than arbitrate.  Likewise, the FAA is limited to
transactions affecting commerce, and de facto requires the con-
sent of both parties to litigate, insofar as an arbitration clause in
an adhesion contract is enforced in the absence of meaningful
consent by the putative plaintiff.  Thus, a plaintiff under such a
clause who prefers litigation cannot submit the merits of the dis-
pute to court without the consent, in the form of a waiver of the
arbitration agreement, of the drafting party.  The right created by
this revised FAA against being haled into court could be called
primary and even fundamental, granted directly to individuals
for assertion against compulsory state process.  That the right is
based on consent, or is waivable, does not make it a matter of
substance rather than procedure, however.  Many plainly proce-
dural rights are waivable, and many procedures are consent-
based.  For example, the effect of the federal removal statute is
that a defendant to a federal claim cannot be sued in state court
without his consent.277  Nor can it be said that the consent ele-
ment makes this hypothetical FAA a matter of (“substantive”)
276 Id . at 30 (holding that “the parties’ private ordering of their affairs” was to be
weighed against “the convenience of the witnesses and those public-interest factors
of systemic integrity and fairness that, in addition to private concerns, come under
the heading of ‘the interest of justice’”).
277 See  28 U.S.C. § 1447. See also supra  note 182 and accompanying text (global
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 79 18-FEB-05 9:29
The Federal Arbitration Act 619
private contract disguised as something else; mutual consent may
be a necessary element of contract, but it does not perfect even
an oral contract.
Contract is simply a formality demonstrating what the law rec-
ognizes as consent.  Contract law is substantive not because con-
tracts express “consent,” and not because the formalities of
contracting are present, but rather because the underlying sub-
ject matter is substantive.  The formalities—legal principles re-
garding offer, acceptance, and consideration, for instance—
become part of substantive law because of the underlying sub-
stance, not because of some magical substantiality of what are,
after all, abstractions.  The underlying substance is what gives
“substantive law”-ness to contracting formalities, not the other
way around.  Quasi-contract principles provide an obvious exam-
ple: A party who provides valuable services without a valid con-
tract is entitled to recover the fair market value of those services
under quantum meruit.278  Likewise, the Fair Labor Standards
Act may require that a minimum wage be paid for those ser-
vices—as a matter of substantive federal law—even if the parties
contracted for a lesser wage or if the parties did not contract at
all.  The right to a minimum wage—clearly, both a primary and a
substantive right—gains its substance from some quality other
than the existence of a contract.  So the fact that the FAA makes
arbitration a matter of contract does not convert arbitration into
“substance.”
What about the fact that the FAA supplies a specific perform-
ance remedy for this contract term?  Although remedies were
generally regarded as procedural, and therefore forum law when
the FAA was enacted in 1925,279 I have acknowledged that our
conception of remedy has migrated in the direction of substance.
Still, a “remedy” for a procedural “right” should not transform
that right into substantive law any more than the contract itself.
A state court litigant aggrieved by her adversary’s unjustified re-
fusal to produce documents in pretrial discovery in a civil case
tobacco settlement would have prohibited class and consolidated actions against
non-consenting defendants).
278 Of course, quantum meruit is arguably a species of restitution, a remedy, and
may therefore have historically been viewed as non-substantive lex fori .  Now, how-
ever, it is considered part of the substantive law of contract. See, e.g. , Grochowski v.
Phoenix Constr., 318 F.3d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2003); Newbery Corp. v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996).
279 See supra  note 166 and accompanying text.
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may have, as a “remedy,” a motion to compel discovery, resulting
in an order commanding disclosure and even monetary sanctions
to compensate for the attorney-time spent in pursuing the mo-
tion.  Nothing about those remedies—essentially an injunction
and damages—would convert the legal standards for granting the
motion to compel into substantive law, and it is hard to imagine
how Congress could be empowered to regulate any aspect of that
procedure in state courts.
Perhaps more importantly, to call the FAA substantive law be-
cause it specifies a specific performance remedy is pure boot-
strapping.  A remedy is substantive to the extent it is bound up
with a substantive right.  Here, specific performance is an equita-
ble remedy for a breach of contract where money damages are
inadequate.  Certainly, it is easy to see how money damages may
be an ineffective means of enforcing arbitration agreements, but
the same might be said for other procedural rights as well.
2. Congressional Alchemy: Substance Because We Say So
In its simplistic form, the argument that Congress could make
section 2 substantive merely by saying so need not detain us for
long.  If Congress lacks the constitutional power to amend state
court procedures, it cannot acquire that power simply by saying
in the statute that it is making substantive law, any more than it
can acquire power over purely intrastate matters by calling them
“interstate commerce.”280  A reviewing court would have to de-
termine whether the law was substantive in some relevant and
legally cognizable sense.  Interestingly, the Southland  Court
failed to do so, relying on an implied congressional say-so.  The
FAA was “substantive law,” according to Southland , merely be-
cause Congress claimed to rely on its commerce power as a basis
for the enactment.  But as we have seen, relying on the com-
merce power does not justify the unconstitutional assertion of
power to commandeer state courts by dictating procedures to
them.  In so holding, Southland  ascribed to Congress a power it
plainly does not have—another of the several serious flaws in
that decision.
There are two more sophisticated versions of this argument,
280 Cf.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (quoting United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)) (“[S]imply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessa-
rily make it so.”).
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however.  One is to say that Congress may view the forum choice
between arbitration and litigation as a significant national regula-
tory matter—an instance where procedure has itself become a
substantive problem.  The other is to say that Congress may
deem certain procedural rights to be fundamental and impose
that choice on the states.
a. A Substantive Federal Interest in State Dispute Resolution?
It could be argued that the FAA is interstate commerce regula-
tion, pure and simple: arbitration agreements affect interstate
commerce, and Congress, by regulating only those contracts “in-
volving commerce” or “in admiralty,” is invoking its commerce
power, which necessarily implies that it is regulating substan-
tively.  This argument is implicit in Southland .  However, it is not
in fact the case that Congress automatically regulates substan-
tively when invoking its commerce power.281  Congress can use
its commerce power to make “housekeeping” (i.e., procedural)
rules for federal courts.282  More importantly, as discussed above,
the fact that disputing procedures plainly affect interstate com-
merce does not make those procedures constitutionally permissi-
ble subjects of commerce regulation.  In any event, the question-
begging quality of this argument should by now be clear.  Al-
though Congress has made contracts involving commerce the cat-
egory of contracts affected, that does not make the nature of the
regulation itself substantive.  The FAA regulates procedures for
contracts involving commerce, and the commerce hook no more
makes the law “substantive” than it would the EDRA or a “Fed-
eral Depositions Act” which provided: “No state court shall al-
low more than ten depositions in any litigated dispute arising out
of a contract involving interstate commerce.”
I have suggested that state courts form part of a national dis-
pute resolution system and are therefore plainly a matter of na-
tional concern.  The aggregate economic consequences of state
court litigation are undoubtedly significant.  Shouldn’t it be
within the power of Congress to say that the state courts are bro-
ken and try to fix them?  Can’t procedure become a substantive
regulatory problem?
The Supreme Court has issued several recent reminders that
the seriousness of national problems does not create powers of
281 See supra  note 53 and accompanying text.
282 See supra note 53.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE203.txt unknown Seq: 82 18-FEB-05 9:29
622 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
Congress that are otherwise unrecognized by the Constitution.283
On closer examination, this argument is simply a repeat of the
Commerce Clause argument discussed above.  If federalism prin-
ciples preserve the state’s autonomy over their own dispute reso-
lution procedures, the fact that they have interstate commerce
implications does not suffice to overcome the state’s autonomy.
And there are serious problems in viewing procedural regulation
as regulation of interstate commerce.
The Constitution affirmatively grants Congress power over
state procedures only through the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The commerce power assumes substantive regulation, rather
than an interest in disputing as such.  In other areas where Con-
gress has displaced state adjudicative processes with statutes ei-
ther granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, such as the
Securities Exchange Act, or creating national tribunals, such as
the National Labor Relations Board, the displacement is justified
by a set of substantive policies deemed suitable for uniform, na-
tional treatment.284  Even if one were tempted to argue that the
FAA creates a “substantive” rule of contract interpretation that
arbitration agreements will always be enforced despite contrary
state policies, there is no substantive subject matter behind the
law, which deals only with a forum choice for dispute resolution.
The notion that a strong, substantive federal interest must be
present in order to justify a preemption of state law is a corollary
of the doctrine of enumerated powers.  That a statute dealing
fundamentally with procedure would preempt state law, or that
an act of Congress would regulate state courts on a matter of
procedure under the Commerce Clause seems constitutionally
problematic.
b. Congress’s Power to Declare Fundamental Rights
It might be argued that the FAA reflects a judgment by Con-
gress that the choice of arbitration over litigation, though proce-
dural, is so fundamental that it should be deemed substantive law
for preemption purposes and should therefore permit a restruc-
turing of state procedures.  But, it should be apparent that if
Congress were deemed to have the authority to regulate state
procedures by declaring procedural rights “fundamental,” the
283 See, e.g. , New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992).
284 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000); National Labor
Board Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
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current understanding of states’ authority over their own judicial
systems would be seriously eroded. Johnson , again, held that a
§ 1983 defendant had no right to demand an interlocutory appeal
from a denial of summary judgment in state court, even though
he would have had that right had the case been heard in a federal
court.  A congressional power, analagous to the FAA, to impose
“fundamental” procedures, would enable Congress to determine
that all states must allow interlocutory appeals from denials of
summary judgment, even in state cases.  This is a power far
broader than the one found to exceed constitutional limits in
Johnson .
This is really a restatement of the Fourteenth Amendment ar-
gument.  It is true that some procedural rights are so fundamen-
tal that they may be imposed on the states.  Congress’s section 5
enforcement power gives it a power to impose a limited range of
procedure rules on the states.  Congress has even created a cate-
gory of substantive “primary rights” creating causes of action for
violations of procedures, whose remedies are procedural correc-
tions.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal habeas corpus both arguably
create substantive causes of action for violation of procedural
norms.  But this category cannot apply to the FAA, which was
not, and under Boerne  could not be, enacted under Congress’s
section 5 enforcement power.  The Due Process Clause is not a
general authorization to Congress to define procedures as “fun-
damental” for Supremacy Clause purposes.  The section 5 en-
forcement power allows Congress narrowly confined leeway to
expand on judicially recognized constitutional rights by creating
remedies for patterns of violations.  There can be no contention
that arbitration is so vastly superior to litigation that states have
violated due process by restricting enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
c. Substantive “Immunity” from Suit?
It might be argued that the FAA is in effect a substantive af-
firmative defense, providing that a suit will be dismissed from
court (and compelled into arbitration).  In this sense, the FAA is
substantive law, and is no different from other substantive law
doctrines that divest a state court of jurisdiction over a claim.
This argument is fatally flawed. A substantive immunity from suit
is a rule shielding the defendant from liability.  If the FAA stated
that “a party to an arbitration agreement shall not be liable for
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any alleged wrong arising out of the contract,” period, then a
state court would have to dismiss a claim brought against such a
defendant as a matter of federal substantive law.  But there
would be no arbitration either.  Enforcement of an arbitration
agreement does not terminate the dispute on the merits, but
shifts it into another forum.  It is thus more analogous to re-
moval.  But removal is a procedural incident to a substantive
right; its divestiture of state court jurisdiction is not itself “sub-
stantive law.”
3. The Federal Freedom of Contract Act
Finally, it might be argued that the FAA creates a federal sub-
stantive regime of freedom of contract that preempts state sub-
stantive law purporting to regulate contract.  This argument
suggests that the displacement of state adjudication in favor of
private arbitration is merely a procedural incident to the substan-
tive “freedom,” the way the right to jury determination was inci-
dent to the FELA claim in Dice .  Under this view, all contracts
containing arbitration agreements are federal—at least insofar as
their provisions can be linked to arbitration—and preempt any
state law that would regulate such a contract.
This argument restates the “enforce as written rule,” discussed
above.  I have argued that the FAA cannot be construed as a
substantive law defense to state contract regulation or a bar to
remedies necessary to effectuate state regulatory policies.  The
Supreme Court has agreed by its repeated admonition that arbi-
tration does not “waive substantive rights.”  Litigants who have
argued otherwise are misconstruing the FAA.  But suppose there
were such a statute.  Could Congress impose arbitration on the
states as part of a statute that did create a substantive federal
defense to state contract regulation?
Let me hypothesize the law that some litigants and scholars
wish upon the FAA:
Any contract involving interstate commerce shall be enforced
as written, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.
We can analyze the constitutionality of applying this law to
contracts that include an arbitration agreement.  Alternatively,
the statute might specifically pertain to arbitration agreements:
Any contract involving interstate commerce which contains an
agreement to arbitrate shall be enforced as written, notwith-
standing any state law to the contrary.
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We now have a substantive federal defense that requires
arbitration.
Congress presumably has the power to federalize all the law of
all contracts involving interstate commerce, and could displace
substantive state contract regulation entirely.  Could it require
state courts to make arbitration part of that?
The answer is still no.  Congress could create a freedom of con-
tract regime by preempting all substantive state regulation of cer-
tain categories of contract, but that preemption would not relieve
Congress of its constitutional obligation to “take the state courts
as it finds them.”  It could not restructure the operation of state
courts by substituting arbitration, unless arbitration were a pro-
cedural incident whose enforcement was necessary to implement-
ing the substantive deregulation.  But it is not.  As seen above,
the Court’s insistence that arbitration is a neutral procedural re-
gime necessarily recognizes that a state’s choice of litigation over
arbitration is itself neutral as to any federal substantive right.
Congress could require arbitration of state court cases only if it
made arbitration into a federal instrumentality and either author-
ized removal or made federal jurisdiction exclusive.
C. The Proper Application of the Procedural FAA
The FAA is a procedural statute that cannot constitutionally
bind state courts or preempt state law. Southland  and its prog-
eny should be overruled.  How then should the FAA be applied?
State law claims in state court would constitute the easiest cat-
egory of cases to resolve.  The FAA simply would not apply, and
arbitration agreements would be governed by state law.  As a
practical matter, given the prevalence of state arbitration acts,
most arbitration agreements would still be enforced.  However,
state law exceptions to their own arbitration acts would be
applicable.285
285 This aspect of overruling Southland  extends to the so-called “federal common
law of arbitrability.”  The Supreme Court in dicta in Moses H. Cone  said the FAA
was an invitation to the courts to make a body of federal substantive law of arbitra-
tion.  Such federal common law raises a huge Erie  problem. Erie  suggests that a
court may not assert substantive lawmaking power displacing state law when its only
springboard is a federal statute that itself does not regulate substantively.  What
distinguishes the Rules of Decision Act from, say, the NLRA, is the lack of a sub-
stantive law concern.  If the federal concern is only with the non-substantive ar-
rangement of state disputing, to create substantive law from such a statute is to
violate Erie .
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Federal question cases in state court would raise a reverse-Erie
issue.  An argument could be made that FAA should be enforce-
able in state court as to federal claims.  However, as discussed
above, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements that arbitration is a
fair procedure without substantive implications should defeat
any argument that arbitration is inextricably bound up with any
federal substantive right.  A party asserting or defending against
a federal claim who believes arbitration is important can remove
the case to federal court, where the FAA will apply.
The FAA was originally intended to provide procedural regu-
lation for the federal courts.  Where a federal court is hearing
state law claims, either under supplemental jurisdiction or diver-
sity jurisdiction, pre-Southland  law holds that the FAA is valid
regulation for federal courts irrespective of whether arbitration is
outcome determinative for Erie  purposes.286  Accordingly, over-
ruling Southland  would restore this original intent, and the FAA
would govern arbitration agreements in federal court.  Yet sec-
tion 2 preserves a role for state law.  Here, the argument over the
general/specific distinction reasserts itself.  Moreover, the FAA
should not be interpreted to strip remedies—such as punitive
damages, attorney fees or class actions—which state law has
deemed necessary for enforcement of the right.  In diversity
cases, this restriction is mandated by Erie ; in supplemental juris-
diction cases, it is a “reverse reverse-Erie” principle, in which
state remedial law is seen as inextricably bound with enforce-
ment of the state right.
CONCLUSION:
FORMALISM AND THE REALITIES OF ADJUDICATION
The conclusion seems to me inescapable that the FAA is un-
constitutional as applied to the states.  It is more than a theoreti-
cal possibility that a statute may be constitutional as enacted but
unconstitutional as construed by the courts.  The classic example,
of course, was the interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act in
Swift v. Tyson .287 Swift  had authorized federal courts, exercising
their diversity jurisdiction, to make independent determinations
of “general” non-federal law, and to freely ignore state court in-
286 See  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-06
(1967); see also supra  note 53.
287 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
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terpretations of state common law.288  In overruling Swift , the
Court in Erie  observed: “If only a question of statutory construc-
tion were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doc-
trine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.  But the
unconstitutionality of the course [pursued] has now been made
clear, and compels us to do so.”289
Southland  is not only erroneous as statutory interpretation, it
is itself unconstitutional—as Swift v. Tyson  was found to be in
Erie .  At the same time, it is difficult to imagine, as of this writ-
ing, that the Supreme Court will reverse its direction after twenty
years of advancing a “national pro-arbitration policy” and admit
that it has made a terrible mistake.  Even though five Justices on
the present Court have at one time or another dissented from
Southland  or a case applying it, there seems to be a settled resig-
nation among the dissenters; perhaps they have come to see it as
a good idea.290
Federalism arguments that lead to acts of Congress being held
unconstitutional often—perhaps more often than not—have a
formalistic quality.  Sometimes the statute makes good policy
sense, and the justices who would find it a violation of the state-
federal balance will admit—in language ambiguously rueful and
proud—that the test of constitutionality in a federalism case is
not the soundness of the policy of the statute.  Rather, the sound-
ness of the Constitution’s policy of federalism can require invali-
dating a good contemporary idea, and can require rigidity rather
than flexibility in approaching a societal problem.  In cases where
federalism is held to pose no obstacle, however, it may well be
federalism and the Constitution itself that are seen to be flexible.
Sometimes the idea of the statute seems just too good.
The FAA is a quaint 1925 procedural statute that has been re-
288 Swift ’s interpretation of section 34 held that the phrase “laws of the several
States” meant a state’s statutes, but not its decisional law.  In the absence of a con-
trolling state statute, the Swift  doctrine opined, federal courts could exercise “inde-
pendent judgment” on any substantive question of “general law,” including
commercial law, torts, and even property matters. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 51-56 (2000).  The theory was that
courts, federal or state, were similarly engaged in the process of attempting to dis-
cover the true pre-existing common law principle—the “brooding omnipresence”
criticized by Holmes. See  Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)
(“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate
voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.”); PURCELL,
supra , at 51, 68-69, 78.
289 Erie , 304 U.S. at 77-78.
290 See  Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra  note 7, at 10.
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shaped by the courts—not by legislative amendment—into a sig-
nificant vehicle of judicial administration.  Most judges like
arbitration: it is, for some, the jewel in the crown of ADR, dis-
posing of cases more finally and certainly than any other ADR
method.  And they like the new FAA, because it allows them to
sweep cases off their dockets.  It is an open secret that the na-
tional policy favoring arbitration is a judges’ policy, not the policy
of Congress in enacting the statute, and everyone knows what
only the occasional dissenter and numerous academic critics
claim: that “the [Supreme] Court has abandoned all pretense of
ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Ar-
bitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own
creation.”291  The Supreme Court has taken some statutory
materials that came to hand and used them to further its own
judicial administration agenda.
If the urge underlying that agenda is strong enough, formalistic
arguments cannot prevail.  A judicial policy whose power is un-
deniable will reshape the rules, rather than the other way around.
Exceptions are created—the FAA is the only federal “substan-
tive right” that creates no subject matter jurisdiction—not be-
cause of doctrinal logic but in spite of it, because the exceptions
serve the underlying policy of judicial promotion of this form of
ADR.  If the argument in this Article is pressed before the
courts, another exception may well be created: the FAA is the
only federal statute that is “substantive” for preemption pur-
poses even though it is really procedural, and procedural for
every other purpose.  Formalistic arguments can persuade only
those who make a principle of the form, or who don’t care
enough about the opposing agenda.
It can be said that there are other factors at work here.  The
“special force” of stare decisis  in statutory cases would seem to
apply here, and perhaps there is a related “water under the
bridge” argument—too many decisions have been issued apply-
ing or building on Southland .  I have addressed the stare decisis
point elsewhere; suffice it to say that the Court must correct its
own mistaken statutory constructions when the mistake is one
that attributes an unconstitutional excess of power to a branch of
291 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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the federal government.292  Even if Congress were to amend the
FAA to reaffirm that it is indeed procedural, and has no applica-
tion to the states, its amendment cannot undo the Court’s consti-
tutional  error of holding—at least implicitly—that Congress can
regulate state court procedures.  As for water under the bridge,
let us assume that vast networks of reliance interests have been
built upon this unconstitutional imposition of federal power on
the states.  The fact is that Congress could undo them with an
amendment to the FAA, one that would probably apply retroac-
tively.293  Those reliance interests, whose existence is in any
event debatable, do not supply a compelling reason for the Court
to fail to correct its unconstitutional course.
As a practical matter, it may be that the question of the consti-
tutionality of the FAA as applied to the states is unwieldy
enough to deter the Court from tackling it.  But there are two
closely related doctrines that allow the Court to reach the proper
resolution without providing a definitive answer to the constitu-
tional question.  A long-established principle of judicial restraint,
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, holds that “if a case can
be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitu-
tional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”294  Thus,
“where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress.”295  The Court has failed to
apply this principle in the Southland  line of cases.
In a closely-related doctrinal development, in Gregory v. Ash-
croft , the Supreme Court established a rule of statutory interpre-
tation designed to protect state autonomy against federal
292 See Erie , 304 U.S. at 77-78; Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes , supra
note 7, at 44-50.
293 See supra  text accompanying notes 213-18.
294 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
295 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).  In Solid Waste Agency , a federal
agency interpreted the Clean Water Act in a manner that raised a federalism-based
constitutional question by “invok[ing] the outer limits of Congress’ power.” Id . at
172.  The Court gave a narrowing construction to the statute to avoid the constitu-
tional issue. Id . at 173-74. See also  Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S.
533, 534, 542 (2002) (holding that federal statute tolling state statutes of limitations
did not apply to suits against the states because contrary interpretation would raise
serious constitutional doubts).
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encroachment: “‘If Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitu-
tional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’
it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.’”296  A subset of this federalism-based
“clear statement” rule is the long-established presumption
against preemption: “‘where . . . the field which Congress is said
to have pre-empted’ includes areas that have ‘been traditionally
occupied by the States,’ congressional intent to supersede state
laws must be ‘clear and manifest.’”297
Even if one were not entirely persuaded by my argument that
the FAA is procedural law, it is hard to deny that Southland ’s
interpretation of the FAA at a minimum “raise[s] serious consti-
tutional problems.”  Likewise, FAA preemption alters the tradi-
tional constitutional balance between the state and federal
governments.  FAA preemption intrudes heavily on state con-
tract regulation, an area the courts should be reluctant to federal-
ize.  FAA preemption also restructures state dispute resolution
procedures, an area over which states have been repeatedly rec-
ognized as sovereign.  No one has seriously argued that Congress
expressed an unmistakeably clear intention to preempt state law.
Applying any of these doctrines in a straightforward manner
should lead to overruling Southland  and its rule of FAA
preemption.
296 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).
297 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)).  “To the
extent that federal statutes are ambiguous, we do not read them to displace state
law.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. , 513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord
Southland v. Keating Corp., 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied
by State law will not be deemed preempted by a federal statute unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).
